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Abstract
In a variety of settings, some payoﬀ-relevant item spreads along a network of connected
individuals. In some cases, the item will benefit those who receive it (for example, a music
download, a stock tip, news about a new research funding source, etc.) while in other cases the
impact may be negative (for example, viruses, both biological and electronic, financial contagion,
and so on). Often, good and bad items may propagate along the same networks, so individuals
must weigh the costs and benefits of being more or less connected to the network. The situation
becomes more complicated (and more interesting) if individuals can also put eﬀort into security,
where security can be thought of as a screening technology that allows an individual to keep
getting the benefits of network connectivity while blocking out the bad items. Drawing on the
network literatures in economics, epidemiology, and applied math, we formulate a model of
network security that can be used to study individual incentives to expand and secure networks
and characterize properties of a symmetric equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Being connected can be both a blessing and a curse. In this paper we build a model of network
formation and security in which there are both benefits and risks to being highly connected to other
agents. Our focus is on the role of the network in spreading non-rival goods (or bads) that are
essentially costless to reproduce and transmit, such as news or viruses. While an agent joins the
network to try to expose herself to any goods — denoted “tips” — that arise, as a consequence of join-
ing she may also be exposed to bads, which we generically call “viruses.” Because tips and viruses
exploit the same network structure to spread, both positive and negative network externalities will
arise from the fact that individual decisions about connections aﬀect others’ exposure. We assume
that individuals can take costly actions that limit the spread of viruses without hindering tips; we
call this security provision. This introduces a third externality, since an individual who blocks a
virus benefits all of the downstream agents that she would have otherwise infected. We study the
micro (individual connection and security choices) and macro (penetration rates of tips and viruses)
properties of equilibrium in a large anonymous economy. To model “large and anonymous,” we
adopt a random graph approach to network formation.
To illustrate the type of settings where these issues arise, we consider a few potential appli-
cations. In epidemiology, the virus metaphor is literal: while people interact face-to-face in order
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to benefit from word of mouth information, these physical connections between people also form
a vector for the spread of disease. People can mitigate disease spread through individual eﬀort,
such as hand-washing and vaccinations. Alternatively, the virus may be electronic. Computer users
benefit from information spread by various types of networks (such as email, file-sharing, or social
media), but undesirable items such as viruses or spam can piggyback on these networks as well. A
user can protect herself (and others) by screening email, installing anti-virus software, and so forth.
In both cases, it is most natural to think of the tip as information, which by its nature is easily
reproduced and transmitted, and often non-rival. Both biological and computer viruses share these
characteristics.
In some other settings, our model may provide useful intuition about tradeoﬀs between openness
and security, even when the application does not precisely match the model assumptions. For
example, in financial markets, both valuable and worthless information circulate, and acting on
worthless information can be costly. In this case, one might think of security as undertaking due
diligence before acting on a rumor and passing it on to other people. Here, the connection to our
model is not tight for various reasons, but some of the incentives and externalities will be similar.1
At an even broader, more heuristic level, there is a tension between the general benefits of an
open, interconnected society (such as ease of communication, electronic banking, and so forth) and
the threat that those very interconnections could make the society more vulnerable to attack, by
terrorists or other malefactors.
As a general template for thinking about issues of connectivity and security in a large anonymous
economy, suppose that we give an agent two choice variables: z, which will be some measure of
his connection intensity or how actively he participates in the network, and f (for firewall), which
will be some measure of his eﬀorts toward avoiding the threats it poses. Suppose that a is some
aggregate variable that summarizes the “good connectivity” of the network — that is, how well it
spreads tips — and b is an aggregate variable that summarizes “bad connectivity” — that is, how
prevalent viruses are. To make this the barest of reduced form models, we would need (inter alia)
two elements: a payoﬀ function for agents, and a general equilibrium mechanism specifying how
individual choices (z, f) aggregate, via some network structure, to get the summary parameters a
and b. A simple payoﬀ function could have the form
Benefit (z, f ; a)−Harm (z, f ; b)− Cost (z, f) (1)
where C (z, f) reflects some direct costs of connections and security, and the first two terms capture
the benefits earned and harms suﬀered from exposure to the network. At this stage, a modeler
might impose some desired form of network externalities, perhaps in the form of constraints on
the cross partial derivatives of the benefit and harm functions. One motive of the paper is to
provide primitive foundations for this reduced form model. We will introduce an explicit network
formation process, derive aggregate parameters a and b, and show that individual payoﬀs take the
form of (1). Furthermore, by micro-founding the benefit and harm functions, we will be able to
derive the structure of network externalities rather than impose it. In linking what might be called
the structural and reduced form models, we aim to address the relatively common complaint that
1Two important distinctions are that financial information is usually not non-rival (although it spreads quickly
nonetheless) and that the value of information is sensitive to when it is received. A third issue is that the harm
suﬀered by acting on bad information due to insuﬃcient due diligence begins to sound like a herding story. It would
be more satisfying to see this modeled rather than to assume it in reduced form.
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network theory is impractical for applied work because it relies too delicately on fine details of
network structure that are rarely observed in data. In our model, the properties of the network
that matter for incentives can be characterized very compactly.
The model is simplest to describe by beginning in the middle. Suppose that agents’ connectivity
and security choices have generated a network, modeled by a graph in which agents are nodes and
connections between them are links. Certain links are firewalled in one or perhaps both directions;
this means that a virus cannot travel along this link in the firewalled direction. The following
completely exogenous events happen next. First, Nature creates a single tip or virus and endows
it on a randomly chosen agent (the “Origin”). Then, if it is a tip, it spreads to every agent who is
linked either directly or indirectly to the Origin. Alternatively, if Nature endows a virus, it spreads
in the same way, but only along links that have not been firewalled. Finally, all agents who have
been exposed receive a common payoﬀ (positive for a tip, negative for a virus); there is no decay or
discounting. The exogenous generation and transmission of tips and viruses is intentionally quite
stylized, as the focus of this paper is elsewhere.
All of the strategic decisions happen one stage earlier. Although agents will act simultane-
ously, in spirit we wish to capture the idea that an agent faces a large, anonymous population
of potential contacts, with only weak information about how they are interconnected or about
who is particularly vigilant. To capture this, we use a random graph model of network formation.
Agents simultaneously choose link intensities and security eﬀorts (z, f). The link intensity could be
thought of as undirected eﬀort devoted toward forming contacts, which pays oﬀ with a stochastic
number of links. A higher security level means that more of these links will be firewalled, although
this too has a random component. Although agents are constrained by the technology of network
formation, they are fully rational: in a Nash equilibrium, z and f are chosen with respect to correct
expectations about others’ strategies, and what they imply about the aggregate properties of the
network.
While the model is formulated with a finite number of agents, all of the analysis will focus on
the large population limit where we can exploit sharp limiting results for random graphs. There is
one other feature of the model that serves a technical purpose in this paper but could be interesting
to study in its own right. In addition to the strategic agents, there is one large, nonstrategic agent
called the hub. At the network formation stage, separately from the strategic choice z, every agent
also forms a link to the hub with a small exogenous probability. Tips and viruses pass through the
hub just as they do through other agents. All of our analysis will focus on the decentralized limit in
which the “size” of the hub (that is, the probability of linking to it) is taken to zero. The purpose
of introducing this central institution only to take it away is somewhat analogous to seeding a rain
cloud or providing a dust particle as a nucleus for a snowflake. The relevant limiting properties of
the network as the hub vanishes are no diﬀerent than they would have been had it never existed at
all, but they are substantially easier to characterize rigorously. For an economic interpretation, it
makes the most sense to think of an institution, such as a government or a healthcare system, or a
forum where clusters of people can gather, such as a website or a club. However, since the role of
the hub will be vanishing and mechanical in this paper, we will not push these interpretations too
far.
A tip or a virus spreads widely if it reaches a positive fraction of the population. In a large
population, a tip need not spread widely — for example, the Origin may be isolated — but if it does,
the fraction of the population reached will be a deterministic function of individual decisions. The
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same is true for the fraction of the population infected by a virus. These fractions, which we call
a and b, turn out to be the key aggregate variables for understanding individual incentives. The
mathematical form of a is well known in the graph theory literature for the case when all link
intensities are symmetric, but equilibrium analysis demands that we consider asymmetric cases
as well (either because the equilibrium is asymmetric or to evaluate deviations from a symmetric
equilibrium). Similar demands arise for b. A modest technical contribution of the paper is to
provide rigorous derivations for these cases (Propositions 1 and 2).
We confine our equilibrium analysis to symmetric equilibria. The interaction of three externali-
ties — positive and negative network externalities, and the public good problem of security provision
— generates a rich and nuanced spectrum of outcomes. One feature that contributes to this richness
is the fact that there are increasing returns to security. This is due to a type of finger-in-the-dyke
eﬀect: the marginal benefit from protecting a single link is small since one is likely to be infected
anyway through other channels. By favoring all-or-nothing security investments, this works against
symmetry, as it is not stable for everyone in the network to be fully secure or completely lax.2
However, symmetric equilibria do exist when the cost of security is suﬃciently convex, and we
study comparative statics for cases in which those costs are also independent of the number of links
protected.3 When security is relatively expensive, equilibria fall into two general classes. If the
severity of threats is low (that is, if viruses are rare or the payoﬀ penalty from exposure is mild),
then a Wild West scenario prevails: people form links profusely, pay lip service to security, and
both the tip exposure rate a and the infection rate b are high. This reverses if threat severity is
high: people cut links drastically (as a substitute for securing them), the network shrinks, and both
a and b are small. Moreover, in the latter case, downward shifts in security costs (due perhaps
to new technology or subsidy policies) will unambiguously make infection rates worse (higher b)
before they eventually improve. The reason is that the lower security costs make it attractive to
form more links, and the aggregate eﬀect of a denser network on virus transmission swamps the
increase in security. If such a change were to result from a policy initiative like a subsidy, it would
be easy to jump to a judgement the policy had failed. We show that if total welfare is the yardstick
(and not infection rates per se), then this judgement would be mistaken, as total welfare, including
the benefits from a denser network, unambiguously rises with such a change.
Next, we put equilibrium networks through a stress test by taking the severity of threats to
infinity. A network is resilient if it does not collapse under this process — that is, if a and individual
payoﬀs remain strictly positive. We show that loosely speaking, a network will be resilient if and
only if agents can obtain at least a small amount of security for free. (More precisely, the first three
derivatives of the cost function must vanish at f = 0.)
The issues addressed in our model have received attention across a broad spectrum of acad-
emic fields and in various applied settings, as one might expect, given the diverse area of topics to
which network flows are germane. In the epidemiology literature, models of disease spread tradi-
tionally have employed strong assumptions about how populations mix that allow the analyst to
avoid modeling networks explicitly. Instead, these assumptions permit disease transmission to be
characterized in terms of systems of diﬀerential equations. However, as more recent work by Mark
2We study the case in which equilibria must be asymmetric in companion work.
3Thus these cases are closer to a flu shot model of protection, where a single investment provides a certain level of
protection for every interaction, than to a hand-washing model where the costs may be proportional to the number
of interactions.
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Newman and various coauthors (notably Newman et al. 2001) has illustrated, the consequences of
assuming away the network structure of disease transmission are not innocuous. This more recent
work takes a graph theoretic approach similar to ours. It is worth highlighting three important
diﬀerences between these papers and ours. First, in considering disease epidemics, Newman (2002)
employs a more detailed model that adheres more closely than we do to the specific features of a
disease outbreak. In contrast, to make the novel features of our model as clear as possible, we have
kept it simple and avoided wedding it too closely to any specific application.
More importantly, the methodology of Newman et al. (2001) and most of the closely related
literature involves using ingenious but non-rigorous generating function arguments establish claims.
To apply this approach, one must be willing to assume properties for the random graph, such as
zero probabilities for some rare events, or independence for weakly correlated events, that are not
strictly true for a finite graph but that one plausibly expects to hold in the limit. Vega-Redondo
(2007) and Jackson (2008) provide accessible treatments of this approach in an economics context.
On the other hand, when link intensities are asymmetric, rigorous proofs of aggregate network
properties by probabilists, as in Molloy and Reed (1995) and (1998) and Chung and Lu (2002), can
be quite lengthy. Since for an economist, these aggregate network properties are in the service of an
economic insight but are not the end in themselves, a modeling strategy that admits parsimonious
but rigorous proofs is attractive. Our device of an infinitesimal hub accomplishes this (although
the proofs are still not as short as one might like).4
Finally, and most importantly for economists, existing network models based on a random
graph generating function approach almost universally treat individuals’ behavior as exogenous.
Our main innovation is to take individual incentives seriously in the context of an equilibrium
model.
Within economics, there has been a steadily growing interest in interactions on networks, with
seminal treatments of network formation by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal
(2000), among others; for book length treatments, see Goyal (2007), Jackson (2008), and Vega-
Redondo (2007). A number of recent papers including Goyal and Vigier (2011), Hoyer and De
Jaegher (2010) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010) study issues of security and reliability of a
network under threat, but the focus in these papers is almost perfectly orthogonal to ours. They
look at situations in which a centralized network designer (or designers) chooses a detailed network
structure with an eye toward foiling the attack of a hostile strategic agent who is well informed
about the structure of the network. Explicitly modeling the behavior of threats is an important
element that we set aside to focus on other issues. The nature of threats diﬀers somewhat in
our setting, as our viruses operate not by disrupting the network but by hijacking it. But more
importantly, our focus on the individual incentives of small, decentralized agents who are not able
to act on the basis of detailed information about the network structure represents the polar opposite
of a command and control design problem.
In the next section, we introduce the model for a finite number of agents and a positive hub
size; then we discuss the limits as the number of agents grows and the hub shrinks. Section 3
derives the aggregate network properties of interest and uses them to derive expressions for agents’
payoﬀs. An impatient reader who is willing to take the results of Propositions 1 and 2 on faith may
want to skip ahead to Section 3.2, or even Section 4. Section 4 presents equilibrium conditions and
4For the general angle of attack on Propositions 1 and 2, we also owe a debt to Durrett (2007).
5
studies the properties of symmetric equilibria. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of limitations
and extensions.
2 Model
2.1 Networks and Items
An nh−economy consists of n small strategic agents, indexed {0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1}, and one large,
nonstrategic player called the hub (H). The term h refers to the size of the hub and will be
discussed later. We call the limit of an nh−economy as n → ∞ a large h−economy, or just an
h−economy. If we additionally let the influence of the hub vanish (in a way to be specified later),
we call the result a large decentralized economy. Our results will focus mainly on large decentralized
economies.
The small agents make strategic choices that influence the creation of a network, which we
model as an undirected random graph in which agents are vertices and links between agents are
edges. Formally, letting In = H ∪ {0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1}, a network for an n−economy is a function
G : I2n → {0, 1}, where G (i, j) = 1 if and only if there is a link between agents i and j. Because the
graph is undirected, we have G (i, j) = G (j, i) for all i and j. Self-links (G (i, i) = 1) are not ruled out
per se, but they will not of any particular interest in what follows. Several notions of connectivity
in G will be important. Define the tth order neighbors of i by N 1G (i) = {j ∈ In | G (i, j) = 1} and
N tG (i) =
©
j ∈ In | G (i0, j) = 1 for some i0 ∈ N t−1G (i)
ª
. We say that i and j communicate in G
if there is a sequence of links that connects them. Mathematically, we write j ∈ NG (i), where
NG (i) = {i} ∪ ¡S∞t=1N tG (i)¢; note that j ∈ NG (i) and i ∈ NG (j) are equivalent. From time to
time, if there is no ambiguity about G, we may use the notation i←→1 j to mean that i and j are
first order neighbors, and i ←→ j to mean that they communicate. A component of the network
is a maximal subset C ⊆ In such that all of the agents in C communicate with each other; that is,
i←→ j for all i, j ∈ C, and i= k for all i ∈ C and k ∈ In\C.
Any undirected graph can be reinterpreted as a directed graph in which each undirected link
i←→1 j is represented by a pair of directed edges from i to j, written i 7→1 j, and from j to i. Given
a network G, an unsecured subnetwork Gf is a directed subgraph of G, formed from G’s directed
counterpart by deleting a subset of the edges. Formally, let Gf be a function Gf : I2n → {0, 1},
where we do not require Gf (i, j) = Gf (j, i), and Gf (i, j) = 1 (equivalently, i 7−→1 j) is interpreted
to mean that there is a directed edge from i to j. Then Gf is an unsecured subnetwork of G if
Gf ≤ G. For reasons that will be clear shortly, we say that i directly infects j if i 7−→1 j, and i
infects j (written i 7−→ j) if there is some chain of agents {k1, k2, ...} and edges i 7−→1 k1 7−→1
k2 7−→1 ... 7−→1 j leading from i to j. Define an agent’s upstream and downstream neighbors:
NUpGf (i) = {j ∈ In | j 7−→ i} ∪ {i} and NDownGf (i) = {j ∈ In | i 7−→ j} ∪ {i}.5 In general, these sets
will not coincide, but note that j ∈ NUpGf (i) if and only if i ∈ NDownGf (j).
The role of the network in our model is to transmit items. Items come in two flavors, desirable
and undesirable, which we label as tips and viruses respectively. Items are generated and spread
in a mechanical way: after the network is formed, one randomly chosen agent is endowed with one
item, which is a tip with probability λ and a virus with probability 1− λ. This agent is called the
5We could equivalently define these as unions of sets of order t upstream and downstream neighbors, in a similar
manner to NG (i).
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Figure 1: The spread of a tip
Figure 2: The spread of a virus. Firewalls indicated by black bars. While agent j firewalls her
direct link to O, she is still infected indirectly.
origin, and without loss of generality, we take him to be agent 0.6 If the item is a tip, it spreads
(costlessly and with no degradation in quality) along the links in G. On the other hand, a virus
spreads only to agents who are downstream of the origin. An agent who is exposed to the item
(including the origin) receives a payoﬀ of A > 0 if it is a tip, or −B (where B > 0) if it is a
virus, while an agent who does not receive the item gets a payoﬀ of zero. Multiple exposure has
no additional eﬀect; the payoﬀ of A or −B is realized at most once by each agent. Thus, agent
i receives A if there is a tip and i ∈ NG (0), −B if there is a virus and i ∈ NDownGf (0), and zero
otherwise.
2.2 Network Formation and Security
An agent i makes two strategic decisions, denoted zi ∈ [0,∞) and fi ∈ [0, 1]. The first one is her
link intensity zi, this determines the mean number of links she will form to other small agents. The
network G is a random graph in which a link between i and j appears with probability proportional
to zizj . The exception is the hub: each agent forms a link to the hub with exogenous probability
6The agents’ labels are completely arbitrary, so we can always reorder them to make the origin agent 0.
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h. We will sometimes refer to h as the size of the hub. The other decision is a security level fi:
this reflects eﬀort to screen out incoming viruses. If i←→1 j in G, then i blocks an infection from
j (j 67−→1 i in Gf ) with probability fi.Thus, for a given network G, positive security levels fi > 0
create a wedge ensuring that viruses do not spread as widely as tips. Timing is as follows: all agents
simultaneously choose zi and fi; then graphs G and Gf are generated; and finally, a single item is
generated, endowed on agent 0, and spreads over the network as described above. Remember that
agent 0 does not know that he is the origin; labeling him this way is just for our convenience. Now
we turn to a more precise statement of how the random graphs G and Gf are formed.
Let (z, f) be a strategy profile for the strategic agents, where z = (z0, z1, ..., zn−1) and f =
(f0, f1, ..., fn−1). On occasion we may write (zn, fn) where it is important to emphasize the size
of the economy. Conditional on (z, f), generate the following collections of independent, binary
zero-one Bernoulli random variables:
ζij for all i, j ∈ In\H such that i ≤ j
ηi for all i ∈ In\H
φij for all i ∈ In and j ∈ In\H
The first set of n(n+1)2 random variables determines whether there is a link between small agents
i and j in G. Whenever i < j, define a mirror image variable ζji equal to the realization of ζij .
Then set G (i, j) = ζij for all i and j in In\H. The probability that a link exists between i and
j is assumed to be Pr
¡ζij = 1¢ = pij = zizjnz¯ , where z¯ = 1nPn−1m=0 zm is the average link intensity.7
Notice that agent i’s expected number of links to other small agents is
E
⎛
⎝ X
j∈In\H
ζij
⎞
⎠ = zi
P
j∈In\H zj
nz¯
= zi
so it is reasonable to think of zi as agent i’s choice of an expected number of connections.
The next set of n random variables determines whether there is a link between each small agent
and the hub: we set G (i,H) = G (H, i) = ηi for all i ∈ In\H. The probability of linking to the hub
is Pr (ηi = 1) = h, independently across agents, and regardless of the strategy profile.
The final set of n (n+ 1) random variables determines whether there is a firewall that blocks
the transmission of a virus from i to j. These firewalls determine the construction of the unsecured
subnetwork Gf relative to G:
Gf (i, j) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
¡
1− φij
¢ ζij = ¡1− φij¢G (i, j) if i, j ∈ In\H¡
1− φHj
¢ ηj = ¡1− φHj¢G (H, j) if i = H, j ∈ In\H
ηi = G (i,H) if j = H
As the definition above indicates, the firewall variable φij only becomes relevant in the event that
G has a link between i and j: in this case we construct the subnetwork Gf by removing the directed
edge i 7−→1 j if φij = 1, and retaining it if φij = 0. Note that φij and φji are two diﬀerent,
independent random variables: j being protected against infection by i is unrelated to whether j
7To ensure that Pr
¡ζij = 1¢ ≤ 1, we do need to impose maxIn\H (zi)2 ≤ nz¯. For large n, in the equilibria that
we look at, this will not be a binding constraint.
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can infect i. Small agents protect their links with the hub in the same way that they protect all
of their other links. By assumption, the hub puts up no defenses; any virus that reaches it passes
through unhindered. The probability of blocking a virus depends entirely on the security level of
the receiving agent: Pr
¡φij = 1¢ = fj , independently across i ∈ In, for all j ∈ In\H.
A few remarks about this security technology may be helpful at this point. First, by choosing
fj = 1, an agent can guarantee that she screens items perfectly. For any fj < 1, her security
will make mistakes with positive probability, and by assumption, these mistakes are on the side of
excessive laxness (viruses sneaking through) rather than excessive vigilance (tips being accidentally
blocked). We make no defense for this assumption, other than that it simplifies the analysis —
expanding the analysis to incorporate both types of mistake would be a natural extension. It is
expositionally convenient but inessential to assume that the firewall variables are realized simulta-
neously before the item is generated. We could alternatively assume that φij is not realized unless
a virus actually arrives at j from i, in which case the security technology succeeds in blocking it
with probability fi — nothing in the model would change under this reinterpretation.8
To illustrate what it means for the random variables φij to be independent across i, consider
a concrete example of a computer virus. In one scenario, suppose there is a universe V consisting
of V = |V| diﬀerent viruses, one of which is dropped randomly on agent 0. Suppose a security
technology of quality f is a software package that can recognize and block fV of the viruses in
V. In this case, we might think of φij and φi0j as perfectly correlated: if (with probability fj)
the virus is one that her antivirus software recognizes, then j is protected along all of her links;
otherwise she is not protected at all. In an alternative scenario, suppose that blocking an incoming
virus requires diﬀerent techniques depending on whether the connection is an email attachment,
a transfer of packets with a web site, an instant message conversation, a Skype phone call, or
some other communication channel. If j tends to communicate on diﬀerent channels with diﬀerent
neighbors and antivirus software does not protect all of these channels equally well, then we would
not expect φij and φi0j to be perfectly correlated. For now, we focus on the latter type of situation.
We reiterate that an agent i commits to (and pays for, as we shall see momentarily) a security
level fi at the same time that she chooses how connected zi to be. Thus she chooses ‘under a veil
of ignorance’ in two senses. First, she does not see her realized number of links before choosing
fi; if she did, she would presumably want to adjust the diligence of her protection depending on
whether she is more or less connected than she expected to be. Second, she cannot focus her
security eﬀorts toward some neighbors more than others — all of her links have the same chance
fi of being protected. While this is surely too extreme, we are constrained by tractability, and in
keeping with the ethos of the paper, we err in the direction of making agents too ignorant rather
than too informed.
2.3 Payoﬀs and Equilibrium Definition
We are now in a position to formally define payoﬀs and equilibrium. As above, let (z, f) be a
strategy profile. A strategy profile in which agent i plays according to some (zi, fi) and the other
agents play according to (z, f) is written
¡
(zi, fi) ; (z, f)−i
¢
. Agent i’s payoﬀ is
8This is because the strategic choices zi and fi precede the realization of any of the random variables, so it is
immaterial when the agents become aware of those realizations.
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πi ¡(zi, fi) ; (z, f)−i¢ = λA Prζ,η,φ (i ∈ NG (0) | zi, z−i)
− (1− λ)B Prζ,η,φ
¡
i ∈ NDownGf (0) | (zi, fi) , (z, f)−i
¢− C (zi, fi)
The subscript (ζ, η,φ), which we will suppress from now on, is a reminder that these probabilities
are taken over realizations of the link and firewall random variables. Because the frequency λ of
tips never appears separately from their magnitude A, we will absorb λ into A. Similarly, we absorb
1− λ into B, rewriting i’s payoﬀ as
πi ¡(zi, fi) ; (z, f)−i¢ = APr (i ∈ NG (0) | zi, z−i)−B Pr ¡i ∈ NDownGf (0) | (zi, fi) , (z, f)−i¢−C (zi, fi)
The final term represents the explicit costs of choosing connectivity zi and security fi. For the
most part, we will assume that forming links is not costly per se, but zi still appears in the cost
function because the cost of security may rise with the number of links secured. If the cost of
attaining security level f rises linearly with the number of links, then we have C (z, f) = zc (f);
we refer to this as the constant MClink case. At the other extreme, if C (z, f) = c (f), then the
cost of protecting z links at level f does not depend on z. This is referred to as the zero MClink
case. Which version of costs is appropriate (if either) will depend on the specific application. For
example, the nuisance cost of handwashing might be expected to scale up with z, whereas a single
flu shot could provide protection against any number of exposures to a particular strain of influenza.
We will often impose the following set of regularity conditions on c (f).
A1 The function c : [0, 1] → R+ is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
convex on (0, 1], and satisfies c (0) = 0, c0 (0) = 0, and limf→1 c0 (f) ≥ B.
While convexity and the other conditions in A1 are introduced with an eye toward giving the
individual’s security decision a unique, interior optimum, they do not guarantee this — there are
parameter regions, and cost functions satisfying A1, for which equilibria with symmetric interior
security levels do not exist. The reason is that the returns to security will also turn out to be
convex.
These payoﬀ functions extend naturally to large h−economies and large decentralized economies.
Now let z and f be infinite sequences, with zn (fn) the truncation of z (f) to its first n terms. We
interpret the pair of truncated sequences (zn, fn) as a strategy profile in a nh-economy. In the
sequel, when we need to separate out the strategic decision (zi, fi) of one agent i with respect to
anticipated behavior (z, f)−i by the other agents, we will often take i = 1 without loss of generality.
In a large decentralized economy, agent 1’s payoﬀ from playing (z, f) when the other agents play
according to (z, f)−1 is defined to be
π1 ¡(z, f) ; (z, f)−1¢ = lim
h→0 limn→∞π1
¡
(z, f) ; (zn, fn)−1
¢
= AA (z; z−1)−BB ¡(z, f) ; (z, f)−1¢− C (z, f)
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where
A (z; z−1) = lim
h→0 limn→∞Pr
¡
1 ∈ NG (0) | z, zn−1
¢
B ¡(z, f) ; (z, f)−1¢ = lim
h→0 limn→∞Pr
¡
1 ∈ NDownGf (0) | (z, f) , (zn, fn)−1
¢
Of course, this payoﬀ is only well defined if the relevant limits exist; later we will show that they
do for the cases that are of interest.
The reason for the order of limits, although technical, is important enough to mention. Our
modeling owes a heavy debt to the random graph literature, where the typical approach is to study
the connectivity of a finite hubless network as n → ∞, in eﬀect reversing our order of limits. In
that literature, there is a substantial gap between what is ‘known’ to be true based on clever,
semi-rigorous arguments, and what has actually been formally proved. One well established result
is that a suﬃciently connected large random graph has (with probability tending to one as n→∞)
a single large O (n) component, called the giant component, while all other components are small
(O (logn) or smaller). In our model, the hub acts as a seed for this giant component. This simplifies
proofs tremendously by allowing us to break down compound events involving the connectivity of i
and j into simpler events about how each of them is connected to H. As far as we are able to tell,
our results would be identical if the order of limits were reversed, but the proofs would be much
more cumbersome.
Now we can define an equilibrium for a large decentralized economy.
Definition 1 A large decentralized economy (LDE) equilibrium is a strategy profile (z∗, f∗) such
that
i) πi ¡(zi, fi) ; (z∗, f∗)−i¢ is well defined for all (zi, fi) ∈ [0,∞) × [0, 1], for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...},
and
ii) (z∗i , f∗i ) maximizes πi
¡
(zi, fi) ; (z
∗, f∗)−i
¢
for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}.
Notice that we define our equilibrium directly in terms of the limiting payoﬀs, not as the limit
of nh-economy equilibria — one should keep this in mind when thinking about the LDE results as an
approximation of behavior in a large finite economy.9 One can think of a symmetric strategy profile,
in the natural way, as a profile in which every agent uses the same strategy (z, f). Asymmetric
profiles and mixed profiles over a finite set of supporting strategies can be thought of informally
in terms of the limiting population shares of each strategy as n goes to infinity; we will be more
precise about this later. For strategy profiles like these, existence of the limiting payoﬀ functions
is not an issue. For most of the paper, we will focus on symmetric equilibria; the next section is
devoted to characterizing the limit payoﬀs for this case.
3 Limiting Properties of G and Gf : the Symmetric Case
In this section, we derive explicit expressions for the limiting probabilitiesA (z˜; z−1) and B
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´
when the strategy profile (z, f)−1 specifies that all agents other than agent 1 play the same strategy
9To be precise, the finite truncation of an LDE equilibrium strategy profile should be a (suitably defined) ε-
equilibrium for the finite economy.
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(z, f). As a side note, one could imagine a diﬀerent modeling approach in which A and B are taken
as the primitives that describe the flows of benefits and harms on a network. One secondary goal
of the analysis in this section is to shed light on some of the features one might want to impose on
A and B if they were taken as primitives of a network model. The analysis starts with the simpler
case of tips (A). In the course of informally deriving A (proofs are in the appendix), we provide a
thumbnail sketch of some of the limiting properties of a large network. In what follows, the phrase
“with probability tending to 1 as n→∞” is a common modifier, so it is useful to have shorthand.
We will write this as (pt1).
3.1 Characterization of the Spread of Tips and Viruses
Proposition 1 Suppose that z is the symmetric limit strategy profile with every term equal to z.
Then for all z˜,
A (z˜; z−1) =
(
0 if z ≤ 1
a
¡
1− e−az˜¢ if z > 1
where a is the unique positive solution to
1− a = e−az . (2)
We start by developing some intuition for Proposition 1 along with some of the machinery used
in the proof; the formal proof is in the appendix. The basic idea is the following. First we show
that it is without loss of generality (pt1) to assume that if agents 0 and 1 communicate, they do
so through the hub. Then to compute the probability that, say, agent 0 communicates with H, we
couple the true enumeration of extended neighbors of 0 (by first order neighbors, then second order
neighbors, and so forth) to a related branching process. The branching process overestimates the
number of neighbors by not treating a doubling back to a previously visited agent as a dead end.
The probability that the branching process dies out before any of its members connect to H is easy
to compute. While this underestimates the probability that the true extended neighborhood fails
to connect to H, we can show that the diﬀerence vanishes as n→∞. The reason is that conditional
on failing to connect to H, the branching process must have died out at a small size relative to
n (pt1), in which case it is very likely (pt1) that the branching process and the true enumeration
never diverged (due to no double-backs). Below, we provide a more complete discussion of some of
these steps.
It helps to have a term for the set of small agents who communicate with i (including i herself),
without using any links to or from H. Define
Si = i ∪ {j ∈ In\H | i and j communicate along at least one path that does not include H}
Next, notice that the event i= H (i fails to connect to the hub) is equivalent to the event that for
all agents j ∈ Si, the random variables ηj have realization zero. We will get considerable mileage
out of the fact that (for fixed h) this event becomes very unlikely if we condition on |Si| being
large: an agent who has many small neighbors is very likely to be connected to the hub as well. In
what follows, Si large will often be taken to mean |Si| > logn, while we may say that Si is small if
|Si| ≤ logn.
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Next observe that the event that agents 0 and 1 communicate can happen in one of two disjoint
ways. First, they may connect through the hub: 0 ↔ H and 1 ↔ H implies 0 ↔ 1.10 Or, they
might be connected with each other despite the fact that neither is connected to H; this is the
event 1↔ 0 ∩ 1= H ∩ 0= H. The first step of the proof is to show that this second case is very
unlikely. The logic is that if agent 0 fails to connect to H, then by the argument above, S0 must be
small. The same is true for agent 1 and S1. But absent a connection to the hub, S0 and S1 must
intersect if we are to have 0↔ 1, and the chance of this intersection vanishes if S0 and S1 are both
small.
Thus, to determine the chance that 0 and 1 communicate, it suﬃces to focus on the first case:
the probability that agents 0 and 1 both communicate with the hub. The next step is to show
that the events 0 ↔ H and 1 ↔ H are approximately independent, so A (z˜; z−1) reduces to the
product of their (limiting) probabilities. It is easier to grasp the intuition of this independence for
the complementary events 0= H and 1= H. These events can only occur if S0 and S1 are both
small, but in this case, they cannot have much influence on each other.
In summary, it suﬃces to characterize the probabilities Prnh ¡0= H | z˜, zn−1¢ and Prnh ¡1= H | z˜, zn−1¢.
To characterize the probability of 0= H, we introduce a thought experiment. Let each small agent
in {0, ..., n− 1} represent a ‘type,’ and suppose that we can generate arbitrarily many distinct indi-
viduals of each type. We grow a population of these individuals according to the following branching
process. Let Wˆt be the set of individuals alive at generation t, and let Rˆt be the set of individuals
who were previously alive. The individuals in Wˆt have children, according to probabilities described
below, and then die; thus we have Rˆt+1 = Rˆt ∪ Wˆt. An individual of type i has either zero or one
child of each type, where the probability that she has a child of type j is pij . (Thus the total
number of progeny for this individual is the sum of n Bernoulli random variables.) These random
variables are independent across individuals. The set Wˆt+1 is defined to be the set of all children of
individuals in Wˆt. In general, Wˆt and Rˆt may contain many distinct individuals of the same type.
The process itself dies out if WˆT is empty, for some T , in which case Rˆt = RˆT for all t ≥ T .
If we initialize this process with Rˆ0 = ∅ and Wˆ0 containing exactly one individual of type 0,
then we can associate Wˆ1 with agent 0’s first order small neighbors. Furthermore, as long as all of
the individuals in Rˆt have diﬀerent types, we can associate Rˆt with the subset of agents in S0 who
are reachable within t links of agent 0. However at some point Wˆt may include a child whose type
already appears in Rˆt. From the standpoint of enumerating the agents in S0, we should ignore this
child, and her progeny, to avoid overcounting. Instead, the process counts her and treats her as an
independent source of population growth. For this reason,
P∞
t=0
¯¯¯
Wˆt
¯¯¯
is larger than |S0|. However,
in the event that S0 turns out to be small, it is very likely that the branching process does not
generate any of these duplicates, and therefore enumerates S0 exactly.
Next, endow each individual in Wˆt (for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}) with an i.i.d. binary random variable
that succeeds or fails with probability h or 1− h. By analogy with the true model, call a success
a connection to the hub. Let Yˆ nh0 be the probability that these random variables fail for every
individual in
S∞
t=0 Wˆt; since this comprises weakly more individuals than there are agents in S0,
we have Prnh
¡
0= H | z˜, zn−1
¢ ≥ Yˆ nh0 . Furthermore, the diﬀerence between these two probabilities
is small because 0 = H can only occur when S0 is small, in which case the branching process is
very likely to enumerate S0 correctly. Fortunately Yˆ nh0 is straightforward to compute.
10Of course 0 and 1 might also be connected by additional paths that do not involve H, but this is immaterial.
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To simplify the computation, pool individuals of typesN\ {1} together as “normal” types, since
their reproduction is governed by exactly the same probabilities, and refer to type 1 as the “deviant”
type. A normal individual produces Bin (n− 1, p00) normal children and Bin (1, p01) deviant ones,
whereas a deviant individual has Bin (n− 1, p01) normal children and Bin (1, p11) deviant ones.
Let Eˆ0 be the event that no individual in the branching process beginning with a single normal
individual connects to H, so Yˆ nh0 = Pr
nh
³
Eˆ0
´
. Let Eˆ1 be the corresponding event for a branching
process beginning with a single deviant individual, with Yˆ nh1 = Pr
nh
³
Eˆ1
´
. Observe that Eˆ0
requires that (i) the initial individual does not connect to H, (ii) for each potential normal child,
either this child does not exist, or she does exist, and event Eˆ0 holds for the independent process
beginning with her, and (iii) for each potential deviant child, either the child does not exist, or she
does exist, and event Eˆ1 holds for the independent process beginning with her. These conditions are
all independent; (i) occurs with probability 1− h, (ii) occurs with probability
³
1− p00 + p00Yˆ nh0
´
for each potential normal child, and (iii) occurs with probability
³
1− p01 + p01Yˆ nh1
´
for the single
potential deviant child. Thus we have
Yˆ nh0 = (1− h)
³
1− p00 + p00Yˆ nh0
´n−1 ³
1− p01 + p01Yˆ nh1
´
(3)
By the same type of argument, Yˆ nh1 must satisfy
Y˜ nh1 = (1− h)
³
1− p01 + p01Yˆ nh0
´n−1 ³
1− p11 + p11Yˆ nh1
´
(4)
Notice that we can write the expression for Y˜ nh0 as (1− h)
³
1− zn+d
³
1− Yˆ nh0
´´n−1 ³
1− z˜n+d
³
1− Yˆ nh1
´´
,
where d = z˜−zz . Taking limits, we have
Yˆ h0 = limn→∞ Yˆ
nh
0 = (1− h) limn→∞
µ
1− z
n+ d
³
1− Yˆ nh0
´¶n−1
lim
n→∞
µ
1− z˜
n+ d
³
1− Yˆ nh1
´¶
= (1− h)
³
e−z(1−Yˆ h0 )
´
(1)
which has a unique positive solution that lies in the interval (0, 1). Mutatis mutandis, the result
for Yˆ h1 is similar; taking limits, we have
Yˆ h1 = (1− h) e−z˜(1−Yˆ h0 )
The expression in Proposition 1 follows by setting a = limh→0
³
1− Yˆ h0
´
.
The formal proof follows the lines of the argument above. Most of the eﬀort involves proving
the various claims about events that occur with vanishing probability as n grows large. Also, in
order to compare the branching process to S0 rigorously, we must construct them on the same
probability space; this involves a fair amount of notation but no major conceptual diﬃculties.
Readers familiar with the graph theory literature will recognize the condition defining a as a
standard expression for the size of the giant component in a random graph. Thus, our device
of “seeding” the network with a large agent H and then reducing its size to h = 0 appears to
generate the same payoﬀ-relevant network properties that would arise in a model without H. With
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or without the hub, any two agents have a vanishing chance of communicating unless they both
happen to belong to the unique giant component. Since its size implies that H belongs to the
giant component (pt1), statements like 0 ↔ H turn out to be a tractable shorthand for agent 0’s
membership in the unique giant component.
Notice that if all agents (including agent 1) play z, the expected fraction of the population
that benefits from a tip is a2 : with probability a the originating agent communicates with a non-
negligible set of agents, in which case fraction a of the population is exposed to her tip. In a large
decentralized economy, a remains at zero unless connectivity rises above the threshold level z = 1.
This is a particularly acute form of network eﬀect: for an individual, there is no point in forming
connections unless aggregate connectivity is great enough. Notice that this result smooths out in a
large h-economy. If we write ah = 1− Yˆ h0 , then it is not hard to see that ah is positive and strictly
increasing for all z.
Next we turn to the spread of viruses.
Proposition 2 Let
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´
be the strategy profile in which agent 1 plays
³
z˜, f˜
´
and
every other agent plays (z, f). Then for all
³
z˜, f˜
´
,
B
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´
=
(
0 if z (1− f) ≤ 1
b
³
1− e−b(1−f˜)z˜
´
if z (1− f) > 1
where b is the unique positive solution to
1− b = e−b(1−f)z .
Notice that the probability B
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´
is exactly the expression that would result from
substituting ‘eﬀective’ link intensity
³
1− f˜
´
z˜ for agent 1, or (1− f) z for the other agents, in
place of z˜ or z in Proposition 1. The simplicity of this correspondence between G and Gf depends
somewhat on the symmetry of this strategy profile; for general strategy profiles, one cannot simply
substitute (1− f) z for z to get appropriate expressions for Gf .
The logic follows the previous proposition quite closely. By analogy with Si, define S
up
i to be
the set of agents who infect i by some path that does not include H. That is j ∈ Supi if and only
if j 7−→1 i or j 7−→1 k1 7−→1 ... 7−→1 km 7−→1 i for some path that does not include H. Define
Sdowni to be the set of agents whom i infects along some path that does not include H. We claim
that if there is no infecting path from agent 0 to agent 1 through the hub (0 7−→ H 7−→ 1), then
agent 0 does not infect agent 1 through any path (pt1). To see why this is true, suppose that
0 7−→ H 7−→ 1 fails because 0 does not infect H. This is only possible if 0 infects relatively few
agents (Sdown0 ≤ logn), in which case the chance that agent 1 is among those infectees is small. A
similar argument applies if 0 7−→ H 7−→ 1 fails because agent 1 is not infected by H. This means
that we can focus on infections that go through H. Next, by an independence argument similar
to Proposition 1 it suﬃces to study the probability 0 7−→ H and H 7−→ 1 one at a time. Finally,
the complementary probabilities of 0 67−→ H and H 67−→ 1 can be computed by a branching process
approximation that is exact in the large n limit.
The branching process used here comes in two flavors, depending on whether we are trying
to enumerate an agent’s downstream infectees or her upstream infectors. For the downstream
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infectees of agent 0, define
³
Wˆ downt , Rˆ
down
t
´
just as
³
Wˆt, Rˆt
´
except for one key change. As above,
an individual of type i has either zero or one child of each type, but the probability that she has a
child of type j is now given by pij (1− fj), where earlier it was simply pij . The interpretation is that
we only count progeny when a link is formed (with probability pij) and that link is not blocked by
the downstream child (with probability 1−fj). As earlier, designate individuals of types N\ {1} as
normal and individuals of type 1 as deviants. Under
³
Wˆ downt , Rˆ
down
t
´
, a normal individual produces
Bin (n− 1, p00 (1− f)) normal children and Bin
³
1, p01
³
1− f˜
´´
deviant ones, while a deviant
individual produces Bin (n− 1, p01 (1− f)) normal children and Bin
³
1, p11
³
1− f˜
´´
deviant ones.
Each of these individuals is endowed with a probability h chance of infecting H. Let Yˆ down,nhi be
the probability that, in a branching process
³
Wˆ downt , Rˆ
down
t
´
starting with a single individual of
type i, no individual in the process infects H. By substituting the new reproduction rates into
equations (3) and (4), we immediately have the following:
Yˆ down,nh0 = (1− h)
³
1− p00 (1− f)
³
1− Yˆ down,nh0
´´n−1 ³
1− p01
³
1− f˜
´³
1− Yˆ down,nh1
´´
Taking limits as before (and implicitly relying on the boundedness of Yˆ down,nh1 ), we arrive at
11
Yˆ down,h0 = limn→∞ Yˆ
down,nh
0 = (1− h) e−z(1−f)
³
1−Yˆ down,h0
´
Recall that we are only interested in this branching process to the extent that it provides a
good approximation of the probability that 0 7−→ H occurs in the true graph Gf . Let bh =
limn→∞ Prnh (0 7−→ H) be this probability for a large h− economy; the final part of the proof links
the branching process to the true graph by showing that bh = 1− Yˆ down,h0 .
Enumerating agent 1’s upstream infectors requires a slight twist. Reverse the interpretation
of the parent-child relationship, so that an individual’s children are those individuals who directly
infect her. To go with this interpretation, define the branching process
³
Wˆupt , Rˆ
up
t
´
with the
following reproduction rates: A normal parent produces Bin (n− 1, p00 (1− f)) normal children
and Bin (1, p01 (1− f)) deviant ones. A deviant parent produces Bin
³
n− 1, p01
³
1− f˜
´´
normal
children and Bin
³
1, p11
³
1− f˜
´´
deviant ones. The only diﬀerence between these downstream and
upstream branching processes is that in the latter case, it is the parent (as the potential infectee)
whose firewall probability applies to the connection. In the downstream case, the child is the the
potential infectee, so it is her type that determines whether a firewall blocks the connection. For
the upstream case, define Yˆ up,nhi to be the probability that no individual in a branching process³
Wˆupt , Rˆ
up
t
´
is infected by H, when the process is started with one individual of type i. Making
the necessary changes in the recursion relationship above, we have
Yˆ up,nh0 = (1− h)
³
1− p00 (1− f)
³
1− Yˆ up,nh0
´´n−1 ³
1− p01 (1− f)
³
1− Yˆ up,nh1
´´
Yˆ up,nh1 = (1− h)
³
1− p01
³
1− f˜
´³
1− Yˆ up,nh0
´´n−1 ³
1− p11
³
1− f˜
´³
1− Yˆ up,nh1
´´
11 Yˆ down,h1 can be calculated in exactly the same way, but it is of no particular interest here.
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Taking limits as n→∞, gives us
Yˆ up,h0 = limn→∞ Yˆ
up,nh
0 = (1− h) e−z(1−f)
³
1−Yˆ up,h0
´
Yˆ up,h1 = limn→∞ Yˆ
up,nh
1 = (1− h) e−z˜(1−f˜)
³
1−Yˆ up,h0
´
Notice that the expressions defining Yˆ up,h0 and Yˆ
down,h
0 are identical. Since this expression has a
unique solution, we have Yˆ up,h0 = Yˆ
down,h
0 = 1− bh.12 In other words, in a large h− economy, with
a symmetric strategy profile (except for one possible deviator), the chance that a normal agent
infects the hub and the chance that he is infected by the hub are the same. This equality would not
typically hold if agents were to choose diﬀerent levels of protection, as agents who choose relatively
higher f will be less likely than others to get infected, but no less likely to pass on an infection that
they originate. To complete the argument, let βh1 = limn→∞ Prnh (H 7−→ 1) be the probability that
H infects agent 1 in Gf , for a large h−economy. The proof establishes that βh1 = 1− Yˆ up,h1 .
Putting both results together, and taking the large decentralized economy limit, the chance that
agent 0 infects agent 1 is limh→0 bhβh1 = bβ1, where β1 = 1−e−z˜(1−f˜)b and b solves b = 1−e−z(1−f)b.
3.2 Interpreting A and B
The derivation of the probabilities A (z˜; z−1) and B
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´
suggests that each one can
be understood in two pieces. For a tip to be transmitted from agent 0 to agent 1, two things must
happen. First agent 0 must belong to the giant component of G; otherwise his tip will not get
broad exposure.13 The giant component has size a (as a fraction of the population), so given the
symmetric strategy profile, agent 0 belongs to it with probability a. Second, agent 1 must have at
least one link into the giant component. Given link intensity z˜, the chance that she fails to link
into the giant component is e−az˜, or conversely, her chance of succeeding is 1− e−az˜. For viruses,
the story is a bit more subtle. There is a set of agents (a fraction b of the population), each of
whom is capable of infecting a positive fraction of the population. A virus cannot spread from
0 to 1 unless (with probability b) 0 is one of these agents. In this case, we also need agent 1 to
form an unprotected link to someone downstream of 0; this happens with probability 1−e−(1−f˜)z˜b.
With a certain amount of imprecision, we will refer to a as total connectivity and to b as unsecured
connectivity for the network.
12To be mathematically precise, there is a second, negative solution, but it has no relevance.
13And this turns out to be equivalent to connecting to H.
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a
1 2 3z
a vs. z (assuming all agents play z) Solid line: h = 0 limit. Dashed line: h = 0.05.
It is not diﬃcult to confirm that a and b coincide if agents choose no security (f = 0) and that
b < a otherwise. Figure ?? illustrates how a varies with z. For fixed f , the relationship of b to z
is similar, but the threshold is shifted right to z = 1/ (1− f). For comparison, the dashed curve
shows ah for a small positive hub size h. In this second curve, one can see a familiar S-shaped
curve: initially there are increasing aggregate returns to additional individual links z, followed by a
region of decreasing aggregate returns where the network is relatively saturated with connections.
In this context, the sharp threshold behavior of a and b in the large decentralized economy can be
understood as a limit of this pattern of first increasing, then decreasing returns.
Next, consider how the shape of agent 1’s payoﬀ function aﬀects her incentives in choosing
links and security. Increasing link intensity z˜ leads to greater benefits from tips through the AA
term, but also to higher costs: both the explicit cost C
³
z˜, f˜
´
and the “virus cost” BB (reflecting
exposure to unblocked viruses) also rise. Notice that both the benefit and the virus cost terms are
concave in z˜: each additional link yields a smaller marginal benefit from tips than the previous link,
but also a smaller marginal harm from viruses. The logic is the same in both cases — the marginal
eﬀect of an additional link depends on the chance that the new link exposes an agent to a tip or
virus, while all of her other links do not. An agent with many links is likely to already be exposed
to the tip or virus, so the eﬀect of the additional link is small. It might appear that in the absence
of an explicit cost C
³
z˜, f˜
´
, and with BB concave, the optimal choice of z˜ could run oﬀ toward
infinity. In fact, one can show that that as long as some security is being provided (either by agent
1 or by the other agents), the marginal benefit from tips shrinks faster with z˜ than the marginal
harm from viruses does, and this would limit link intensity even if there were no explicit costs
associated with z˜. Notice also that AA−BB is convex in agent 1’s security level f˜ . This makes
sense after considering that an increase in f˜ aﬀects harm from viruses similarly to a reduction in
z˜ — both changes reduce her eﬀective link intensity z˜eff =
³
1− f˜
´
z˜. In both cases, removing an
eﬀective link at the margin has a smaller impact for a highly connected agent (z˜ large or f˜ small)
because she is still likely to catch the virus via one of her other eﬀective links. The convexity of
the benefits from security tends to stack the deck against moderate levels of f˜ ; unless C
³
z˜, f˜
´
is
also suﬃciently convex, agents may find all or nothing security decisions (f˜ = 1 or f˜ = 0) optimal.
Finally, consider the interaction between aggregate properties of the network, like a and b,
and individual incentives. First, unless other agents are suﬃciently connected (z > 1), aggregate
connectivity will be nil (a = 0), and so there will be no benefit for agent 1 in forming links.
When a > 0, we have ∂2∂a∂z˜AA (z˜; z−1) = (2− az˜)Aae−az˜, so whenever a and z˜ are not too large
18
(az˜ < 2) a rise in total connectivity will tend to make marginal links more attractive for agent 1.
Together, these two points constitute a positive network eﬀect. However, if both the network and
agent 1 individually are fairly saturated with connections (az˜ > 2), then a further rise in a reduces
the return to z˜. Thus we anticipate the positive network eﬀect to be self-limiting.14 There is a
similar relationship between unsecured connectivity and an individual agent’s eﬀective links; we
have ∂2∂b∂z˜effBB = (2− bz˜eff )Bbe−bz˜eff . Thus, when the network is relatively safe (bz˜eff < 2), a
rise in b increases the marginal harm to agent 1 from increasing links z˜ or reducing security f˜ . This
tends to act against the positive network eﬀect from tips, because when other agents add links, b
will rise, encouraging agent 1 to reduce z˜ or increase f˜ . However, in a relatively unsafe network
(bz˜eff > 2), the incentives flip — in this case, a shift by other agents toward more connected or less
secure behavior (and thus higher b) encourages agent 1 to become more connected and less cautious
herself. Consequently, there may be a tendency for cautious or risky behavior in the network to be
self-reinforcing.
4 Symmetric Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the symmetric equilibria of a large decentralized economy under
diﬀerent cost structures. The sharpest results are obtained when security costs are extremely
convex in f ; we lead with the degenerate case in which security is free below a threshold f¯ and
infinitely costly above it. If we relax this to a smooth convex security cost, the results are similar,
but it becomes harder to ensure that the necessary first order conditions for equilibrium are also
suﬃcient. One complicating factor, as discussed earlier, is the convexity of benefits from security,
which tempts agents toward all or nothing security decisions. Since this issue will be discussed in
more depth when we consider elastic security costs, its treatment here will be brief.
Before turning to the case of step function security costs, consider the case in which C (z, f) is
diﬀerentiable. If a symmetric equilibrium exists at the interior strategy (z, f), then agent 1’s payoﬀ
must satisfy the following first order conditions:
∂
∂z˜π1
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´¯¯¯¯
(z˜,f˜)=(z,f)
= Aa2e−az −Bb2 (1− f) e−(1−f)zb − Cz (z, f) = 0
∂
∂f˜ π1
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´¯¯¯¯
(z˜,f˜)=(z,f)
= Bb2ze−(1−f)zb − Cf (z, f) = 0
and total and unsecured connectivity must be generated from individual choices according to a =
1 − e−az and b = 1 − e−(1−f)zb respectively. We can use these aggregation equations to write the
first order conditions as
Aa2 (1− a) = Cz (z, f) + 1− f
z
Cf (z, f)
Bb2 (1− b) = 1
z
Cf (z, f)
14Recall that 1−e−az˜ can be interpreted as the probability that agent 1 connects to a non-negligible fraction of the
population. Notice that the eﬀect of a on the marginal benefit from z˜ changes sign precisely when this probability is
1− e−2 ≈ 0.86.
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This highlights two facts. First, at equilibrium, the cost of an increase in connections can be
represented by the direct cost Cz (z, f) plus the indirect cost of ‘sterilizing’ the increase in z with
an increase in f that is suﬃcient to hold (1− f) z constant. Second, the lefthand side of both
equations makes it clear that an agent’s choices have the greatest impact on her connectivity when
the network itself is moderately well connected (a and b near 23).
4.1 Case 1: Inelastic Security Costs
As an idealization of a situation in which modest security measures are cheap, but additional
measures are progressively more expensive, define C (z, f) as
C (z, f) =
(
0 if f ≤ f¯
∞ if f > f¯
To avoid special cases, we will assume that f¯ ∈ (0, 1). Under these costs, an agent will always
choose as much free security as possible, so we replace the first order condition for security with
the condition f = f¯ .15 Since it is correct but confusing to refer to an increase in f¯ as a decline in
security costs, we will describe this equivalently as a rise in ‘security capacity.’ Given a strategy
profile of
¡
z, f¯
¢
−1 for the other agents, agent 1’s marginal payoﬀ from z˜ can be written as
∂
∂z˜π1
³¡
z˜, f¯
¢
;
¡
z, f¯
¢
−1
´
= e−az˜
³
Aa2 −Bb2 ¡1− f¯¢ e(a−(1−f¯)b)z˜´
It is clear that there always exists a trivial zero connection equilibrium: if z = 0, then a = b = 0,
and z˜ = 0 is a weak best response for agent 1. We focus on the more interesting case in which
z > 1, so the network has strictly positive total connectivity. Note that because
¡
1− f¯¢ b < a,
the derivative is either negative for all z˜ ≥ 0 (if Aa2 ≤ Bb2 ¡1− f¯¢) or switches from positive to
negative exactly once. Thus, any strictly positive solution that we find to agent 1’s first order
condition will be an optimal decision for her. This permits us to characterize equilibria as follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose a large decentralized economy has costs as described above, with security
capacity f¯ . There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium with positive total connectivity. The
equilibrium strategy profile satisfies z = − ln(1−a)a and f = f¯ , with a and b determined by the unique
(on (a, b) ∈ (0, 1)2 , b ≤ a) solution to the following pair of equations:
Aa2 (1− a) = Bb2 (1− b) ¡1− f¯¢ (5)
1− f¯ = a
b
ln (1− b)
ln (1− a) (6)
Equation (5) represents the first order condition for links, interpreted in terms of the aggregate
network variables a and b, and evaluated when link choices are symmetric. One can see again
15To be more precise, an agent strictly prefers higher security unless b = 0, in which case she is indiﬀerent. To
streamline the discussion, we break this indiﬀerence by assuming that f = f¯ is chosen even if b = 0. This is without
loss of generality — if an equilibrium exists with b = 0 and f < f¯ , then there is an outcome equivalent equilibrium
with f = f¯ .
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Figure 3: Equilibrium with security capacity f¯ . Left: eqn. (7) at assorted values of B. (A = 1.)
Middle and right: equilibrium condition (6) — dashed — at increasing values of f¯ , vs. (7).
that the marginal benefit from links interacts in a non-monotonic way with total connectivity a,
first rising, then falling. Likewise, the marginal harm from links is first rising and then falling in
unsecured connectivity b. Equation (6) reflects the technological constraint specifying how total
and unsecured connectivity must diﬀer if agents choose security level f¯ .
With inelastic security costs, the model has only two free parameters: the security capacity f¯ ,
and the relative threat level B/A. In order to illustrate their comparative static eﬀects, it is useful
to transform the equilibrium conditions so that the eﬀects of f¯ and B are separated. Substitute
(6) into (5) to get
AΥ (a) = BΥ (b) , (7)
where Υ (x) = −x (1− x) ln (1− x). Together, (7) and (6) are an equivalent representation of the
equilibrium conditions, but now f¯ and B/A appear in separate equations. Examples of the curves
defined by (7) and (6) are plotted in Figure 3.16 The function Υ has a natural interpretation. Set
Benefit (z˜) = Aa
¡
1− e−az˜¢ and Harm (z˜eff ) = Bb ¡1− e−bz˜eff ¢. We can recast the individual’s
decision problem as a maximization of Benefit (z˜)−Harm (z˜eff ) over total and eﬀective connec-
tivity, z˜ and z˜eff , subject to the constraint that z˜eff/z˜ = 1− f¯ . Because an individual can make
a proportional increase or decrease in both types of connectivity without changing the value of the
constraint, at an optimal decision the marginal benefit induced by a percentage increase in z˜ must
balance the marginal harm induced by a percentage increase in z˜eff . That is
dBenefit (z˜)
dz˜/z˜
=
dHarm (z˜eff )
dz˜eff/z˜eff
Evaluated at a symmetric profile z, we have
dBenefit (z˜)
dz˜/z˜
¯¯¯¯
z˜=z
= Az˜a2e−az˜
¯¯
z˜=z=− ln(1−a)
a
,e−az=1−a = AΥ (a) .
Similarly, BΥ (b) is the marginal harm, or −BΥ (b) the marginal payoﬀ change, induced by a
16As the right panel of Figure 3 suggests, the most delicate part of the proof of Proposition 3 is to show existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium when f¯ is near zero.
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Figure 4: Regions where individual and aggregate connectivity are complements or substitutes at
equilibrium. (az : total, bzeff : unsecured)
percentage increase in z˜eff , evaluated at a symmetric strategy profile.
The sign of the derivative AΥ0 (a) tells us something about how an individual’s incentive to form
more links rises or falls with an increase in aggregate connectivity; we will say that individual and
aggregate total connectivity are complements (substitutes) at equilibrium if AΥ0 (a) > 0 (AΥ0 (a) <
0). Similarly, let individual and aggregate unsecured connectivity be complements (substitutes) at
equilibrium if BΥ0 (b) < 0 (BΥ0 (b) > 0); the sign change reflects the fact that threats enter payoﬀs
with a negative sign. Figure 4 illustrates the regions in a-b space where each case applies. It is not
hard to show that Υ (x) is quasiconcave on (0, 1], with Υ (1) = 0, limx→0Υ (x) = 0, and a peak at
υ¯ ≈ 0.764, so the feedback between individual and aggregate actions will tend to change around
a = υ¯ or b = υ¯.
Comparative statics of a change in security capacity f¯
Regardless of f¯ , any equilibrium must lie along the curve AΥ (a) = BΥ (b), which is depicted
in the left panel of Figure 3 for various values of B/A. One end of this curve is anchored at the
social bliss point (a, b) = (1, 0). However, the other end of the curve depends on the relative threat
level. If B < A, the curve terminates at a dense, unsecure network (1, 1), while if B > A it ends
at a sparse but safe network (0, 0).17 The curve defined by (6) is upward sloping (in a-b space)
and within the a-b unit square, it ranges between a positive intercept at b = 0 axis and a limit at
(1, 1), as illustrated in the middle and right panels of Figure 3. As f¯ increases, this curve shifts to
the right. If we carry out the thought experiment of fixing A and B and tracing out the unique
equilibrium as the security capacity rises from nil to full security, the path that is traced out is
precisely the curve AΥ (a) = BΥ (b). Examples are shown in Figure 3 for the case of a high (B = 2)
or low (B = 0.9) threat level; we note as a remark that these examples are representative.
Remark 1 Fix B, and trace out the sequence of equilibria as security capacity rises from f¯ = 0
to f¯ = 1. If the threat level is mild (B < A), then a and b both start at 1. Exposure to viruses b
declines uniformly toward 0 as f¯ rises, while exposure to tips a first declines, then eventually rises
toward 1. If the threat level is severe (B > A), then a and b both start at 0. Exposure to tips rises
uniformly toward 1 as f¯ rises, while exposure to viruses first rises then eventually falls toward 0.
17 In the knife edge case B = 1, the other end of the curve Υ (a) = BΥ (b) terminates at a = b = υ¯.
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Figure 5: Comparative statics of a rising threat level B. Left: equilibrium condition (6) at f¯ = 0.2
(in bold) vs. condition (7) for various levels of B. (A = 1.) Middle and right: equilibrium b and
utility vs. B.
In lieu of a proof, we oﬀer an informal intuitive argument. The logic is simplest to convey in the
other direction, as f¯ declines. When perfect security is free, the economy must be at (a, b) = (1, 0).
From this point, agents initially absorb reductions in f¯ by both reducing z and by accepting higher
zeff . At this stage, both AΥ (a) and BΥ (b) are rising, as each additional percentage reduction in
good links, or increase in bad ones becomes more painful. As the security capacity continues to
decline, eventually one of these two terms hits its maximum value AΥ (υ¯) or BΥ (υ¯) — the former
if A < B, or the latter if A > B. Consider the first case, where A < B. At this point, accepting
increases in zeff is still increasingly painful as f¯ falls, but accepting decreases in z becomes less
painful. The reason is that z and a have become complements at equilibrium, so the fact that all
other agents are reducing total links as f¯ falls makes an individual’s marginal links less valuable.
Rather than continue to absorb reduced security by raising zeff and reducing z, now it makes
sense for an individual to begin to “buy back” reductions in zeff with even larger reductions in
z. Consequently, a and b begin to fall. To put the same point a diﬀerent way, as a falls below υ¯,
positive network eﬀects begin to take over for total connectivity, so further declines in a tend to be
reinforced.
Alternatively, if A > B, then as security capacity declines, b rises to υ¯ before a falls to υ¯. As f¯
continues to decline, b and zeff become complements, so further increases in b tend to make it less
painful to accept additional unsecured links. The logic amounts to fatalism: for larger and larger
b, one is so likely to catch the virus in any case that a few more links make little diﬀerence. In this
case, it begins to make sense for an individual to buy back more total links z by accepting higher
zeff . As a result, both a and b begin to rise.
Put more simply, the economy responds to limited security diﬀerently depending on the threat
level B. If B is low, agents opt to be highly connected in order to be sure to receive tips, implicitly
giving up on trying to avoid viruses. However, if the threat level is high, agents emphasize avoiding
viruses by remaining fairly isolated, implicitly accepting that this means they will rarely benefit
from tips.
Comparative statics of a change in the threat level B
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Next, we examine how equilibrium behavior changes as the threat level B rises, holding the
security capacity f¯ fixed. In this case, equation (6), which does not contain A or B, defines the set
of states (a, b) that the economy traces out as B varies; examples are plotted in the left panel of
Figure 5. For a threat level near zero, the economy tends toward a dense network in which all tips
and viruses are received by all agents.18 As the threat level rises, both aggregate exposure to tips
and to viruses decline, driven by a decrease in individual links z. When the security capacity f¯ is
low, a and b decline more or less in tandem as B rises. However, when f¯ is larger, equation (6) is
more bowed away from the 45◦ line, so reductions in b are bought with less of a sacrifice in good
connectivity a.
One interesting experiment is to study how the economy responds to the ‘stress test’ of taking
the threat level B to infinity, holding A and f¯ fixed; the middle and right panels of Figure 5
illustrate this. It is immediate from (5) that in equilibrium, b must tend to zero if B → ∞. This
implies that the number of unsecured links per agent, zeff = − ln(1−b)b , tends to one as B grows.
This in turn implies that z → 1
1−f¯ . In other words, the network survives the threat, with total
connectivity falling just far enough to drive the infection rate b to zero. We are also concerned
about how the individual equilibrium payoﬀ of πeq = Aa2−Bb2 fares in this high threat limit. Let
us write zˆ and aˆ for the limiting individual and aggregate connectivity, so zˆ = − ln(1−aˆ)aˆ = 11−f¯ .
Although B →∞ and b→ 0, the expected harm term Bb2 remains positive and finite. To evaluate
it, use (5) to get
lim
B→∞Bb
2 =
Aaˆ2 (1− aˆ)
1− f¯ = Aaˆ
2 (1− aˆ) zˆ = AΥ (aˆ) .
An agent’s limiting payoﬀ is then
πˆ = A ¡aˆ2 −Υ (aˆ)¢ = Aaˆ (aˆ+ (1− aˆ) ln (1− aˆ))
This payoﬀ is strictly positive and increasing in aˆ.19 In this sense, both the network and equilibrium
payoﬀs are robust: no matter how severe the threat level, payoﬀs will never be driven below πˆ.
Furthermore, πˆ is increasing in f¯ (because zˆ and aˆ increase in f¯), so increasing the security capacity
raises the lower bound on payoﬀs. To put this bound in perspective, note that in a threat-free world
(B → 0), a tends to one and payoﬀs tend to A. Thus, 1− πˆA = 1− aˆ2 +Υ (aˆ) represents an upper
bound on the fraction of these threat-free payoﬀs that a virus can destroy. For example, if agents’
success rate at screening out viruses is f¯ = 13 , then viruses cannot erode more than 1− πˆA ≈ 87.3%
of the network’s threat-free value. If screening improves to f¯ = 23 , this upper bound payoﬀ improves
to 1− πˆA ≈ 27.3% of the threat-free value.
4.1.1 Welfare and Policy Implications
Our measure of welfare in a symmetric equilibrium will be an agent’s payoﬀ. Since the terms¡
1− e−az˜¢ and ³1− e−b(1−f˜)z˜´ reduce to a and b at the equilibrium strategy ³z˜, f˜´ = (z, f),
welfare reduces to
πeq = Aa2 −Bb2
18Of course an explicit cost to forming links would temper this result.
19One can see this by checking the derivative, or also by expanding ln (1− aˆ) to get: πˆ =
Aaˆ
³
aˆ2
2
+ aˆ
3
6
+ aˆ
4
12
+ ...+ aˆ
t
t(t−1) + ...
´
.
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We open the discussion of welfare with a simple policy question: if a social planner has the ability
to improve the security technology available to individuals, should it do so? More precisely, will
an increase in f¯ improve equilibrium welfare?20 Based on Remark 1, the answer is unambiguously
yes if the initial level of security is suﬃciently good. For f¯ large enough, further increases in f¯ will
raise total connectivity a and reduce unsecured connectivity b (regardless of the relative size of A
and B). If security is initially poor, the answer is less obvious — improving f¯ will have at least one
eﬀect, either reducing exposure to tips a or increasing exposure to viruses b, that is deleterious to
welfare. The latter case could be particularly embarrassing for a policymaker, as its pro-security
intervention would appear to have an eﬀect opposite to the one intended. The next result indicates
that these concerns are of secondary importance.
Proposition 4 The sign of dπeq
df¯
is unambiguously positive. Thus, improvements in security tech-
nology always improve equilibrium welfare.
Next, we consider a social planner who can enforce any symmetric strategy profile (z, f), subject
to the technological constraint imposed by f¯ . One can think of the restriction to symmetric profiles
as capturing some notion of equal treatment.21 Clearly, the social planner will set each agent’s
security at f¯ , so the only question is the socially optimal link intensity z. The social planner’s first
order condition is
dπeq
dz
=MSB (z)−MSH (z) = 0
whereMSB (z) = 2Aadadz andMSH (z) = 2Bb
db
dz stand for marginal social benefit and harm respec-
tively. For the purpose of comparison, writeMPB (z) = Aa2 (1− a) andMPH = Bb2 (1− b) ¡1− f¯¢
for the marginal private benefit or harm (evaluated at a symmetric strategy profile) that are the ba-
sis for individuals’ decisions about z. Using the relationships z = − ln(1−a)a and z
¡
1− f¯¢ = − ln(1−b)b ,
we can write
MSB (z) = 2M (a) ·MPB (z)
MSH (z) = 2M (b) ·MPH (z)
where M (x) = 1
1−1−x
x
|ln(1−x)| . The externality that separates the private and social benefits to
additional links can be split into two pieces. First, there is an extra factor of two in the marginal
social benefit; this reflects the fact that agents i and j each receive an identical expected benefit if a
link forms between the two of them, but i only accounts for her own share of this gain. The second
term M (a) arises from the fact that an individual agent ignores the impact of her link decision on
aggregate connectivity. The diﬀerence between the private and social harm terms has exactly the
same structure. It may be instructive to note that the social benefit multiplier may also be written
M (a) = 11−z(1−a) = 1+ z (1− a) + z2 (1− a)2+ ..., which would be the expected number of agents
20Of course, improving individuals’ security technology may be costly for the government; those costs are not
considered here.
21This is somewhat imprecise, as an asymmetric strategy profile could still give all agents the same payoﬀ.
One naturally wonders how a social planner would allocate links and security if the symmetry restriction were
lifted. (Of course the social welfare function would need to be extended.) This question appears to be substantially
more diﬃcult, and we do not have results on it at this time.
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in agent i’s neighborhood (including herself) if each agent were to form (in expectation) z (1− a)
onward links, with no overlaps. Standard results in branching theory suggest that M (a) can be
interpreted as agent i’s expected neighborhood size, conditional on not linking to the hub.22 In this
interpretation, the multiplier reflects the number of agents who would benefit if a marginal link by i
turns out to be successful. The social harm multiplier, which may be writtenM (b) = 1
1−z(1−f¯)(1−b) ,
can be given a similar interpretation.
It is not diﬃcult to confirm that M (x) is decreasing on (0, 1), so we have M (a) < M (b): the
negative externality exceeds the positive one. There are two, complementary ways to think about
this. One is to appeal again to the relationship between individual and aggregate connectivity
illustrated in Figure ??. Additional individual connections z have the greatest aggregate impact
when a and b are positive but small. Because of security, b always lies further to the left on this
curve than a does, where the marginal impact of z is larger. A second rationale, based on the
neighborhood size interpretation, is that the expected size of a neighborhood that fails to connect
to the hub is larger in the virus sub-network than in the tip network. This is true, although
perhaps counterintuitive, and has to do with the conditioning: in the better-connected tip network,
isolated neighborhoods tend to pick up a connection into the hub before they ever grow too large.
As aggregate connectivity is just emerging, the externality is particularly acute: M (x) tends to
infinity as x goes to zero. In contrast, M (x) tends to 1 as x goes to 1, so in a densely connected
network, this component of the externality disappears.
If we write zeq for the equilibrium level of links, we have MPB (zeq) =MPH (zeq), and there-
fore, MSB (zeq) < MSH (zeq). The next proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 5 Fix security capacity f¯ . Suppose that
¡
zopt, f¯
¢
maximizes welfare over all symmet-
ric strategy profiles, while zeq is the symmetric equilibrium link intensity. Then zopt < zeq. That
is, agents are more connected in equilibrium than would be socially optimal.
Before moving on, it is worth making one final remark about the expression for the lower bound
equilibrium payoﬀ πˆ derived in the last section. We argued that as B rises, individual incentives
tend to drive b to zero roughly at rate 1√
B
. It is not hard to show that the social optimum involves
driving b to zero more quickly — at rate 1B — so that Bb
2 → 0. This is accomplished by taking
individual and total connectivity to the same limits as before as B rises, zˆ and aˆ, but more quickly.
In the B →∞ limit, socially optimal welfare is therefore Aaˆ2. Meanwhile, notice that the limiting
equilibrium payoﬀ may be written πˆ = Aaˆ2M(aˆ) . Thus, even though equilibrium payoﬀs can withstand
high threat levels fairly successfully, a social planner could do substantially better by tweaking
behavior only slightly (since zopt → zeq → zˆ as B → ∞). Moreover, the factor by which payoﬀs
could be improved, M (aˆ), is directly related to the uninternalized eﬀect of an agent’s links on
aggregate connectivity.
4.2 Case 2: Elastic, Link-Independent Security Costs
The assumption that agents cannot improve security above f¯ at any price is unattractive, and in
this section we relax it. Throughout the section, security costs are assumed to take the following
form
C (z, f) = c (f) (8)
22See, e.g., Durrett (2007).
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where c is an increasing, convex function on [0,∞) with c (0) = 0. Since this cost function does not
include z, it belongs to the class of zeroMClink functions discussed earlier. The natural examples of
zeroMClink costs are investments like antivirus software or a flu shot, where a screening technology
of quality f can screen arbitrarily many contacts at no additional cost. The necessary conditions
for an interior equilibrium constrain the relationship between a and b just as earlier, but there
is an additional constraint involving the marginal cost of security. Now an individual has two
instruments for avoiding viruses — decreasing z or increasing f — and in equilibrium their marginal
utility costs must be equalized.
Proposition 6 Given aggregate connectivity (a, b) ∈ (0, 1)2, an interior best response
³
zˆ, fˆ
´
for
an individual agent must satisfy the first order conditions
Aa2zˆe−azˆ =
³
1− fˆ
´
c0
³
fˆ
´
= Bb2zˆeffe
−bzˆeff (9)
(where zˆeff =
³
1− fˆ
´
zˆ). If (a, b) represents an interior symmetric equilibrium, then (9) implies
that the following conditions hold (where f = 1− ab ln(1−b)ln(1−a))
AΥ (a) = (1− f) c0 (f) = BΥ (b) . (10)
Once again, any equilibrium must lie along the curve defined by AΥ (a) = BΥ (b). Equation
(10) oﬀers some insight about why existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium are less
straightforward here than they were in the previous section. The middle term can be written
(1− f) c0 (f) = ddδ c (f + δ (1− f))
¯¯
δ=0 ; this is the marginal cost of increasing security so as to
reduce one’s exposure (1− f) by a small percentage. The outer terms reflect the marginal benefit
of that security investment, in a symmetric strategy profile, depending on whether those benefits
are taken in the form of lower exposure to viruses (BΥ (b)) or by increasing exposure to tips while
holding virus exposure constant (AΥ (a)).
There are several issues to address. First, a conventional regularity assumption would be to
set c0 (0) = 0, but here that is not enough to guarantee a positive level of security in equilibrium.
To see where the problem arises, recall from the previous section that (given AΥ (a) = BΥ (b))
a low security equilibrium must have a and b both near zero or both near one. If c0 (0) = 0, the
cost of a small security investment by all agents will be negligible for each agent, but the marginal
benefit it induces will also be near zero. For a and b small, the positive network externality (which
causes AΥ (a) to scale up or down with a, and BΥ (b) with b) is to blame. For a and b near 1,
network saturation is to blame — a small change in f has little eﬀect on connectivity. If c0 (f) does
not tend to zero quickly enough with f , then there will be values of A and B for which no interior
equilibrium can be sustained. The same basic factors (increasing marginal benefits on some range,
paired with insuﬃciently convex marginal costs) can give rise to multiple interior equilibria.
At the other end of the spectrum, if (1− f) c0 (f) is bounded above, then for A and B large
enough agents will be attracted to full security: f = 1. However, this implies that any equilibrium
would need to be asymmetric. (If all agents chose f = 1, we would have b = 0, obviating the need
for security in the first place.) The simplest condition that ensures an interior equilibrium choice
f < 1, is substantially stronger than convexity of c:
C (1− f) c0 (f) is increasing (equivalently, c00(f)c0(f) > 11−f ) and tends to ∞ as f → 1.
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With these issues in mind, we take a SecondWelfare Theorem approach to equilibrium existence:
we show that every outcome along the curve AΥ (a) = BΥ (b) is supported as an equilibrium by
some suﬃciently convex cost function. To formalize ‘suﬃciently convex,’ we imagine tilting the
marginal cost function about some pivot point f∗.
Definition 2 Fix a convex cost function c (f). An alternative cost function cm,f∗ (f), called the
m-tilt of c about f∗, is defined by c0m,f∗ (f) = r (f) c0 (f) , where r (f) =
³
c0(f)
c0(f∗)
´m
.
Then we have:
Proposition 7 Suppose that (a∗, b∗) ∈
n
(0, 1)2 : b∗ < a∗
o
satisfies AΥ (a∗) = BΥ (b∗). Let f∗ =
1− a∗b∗ ln(1−b
∗)
ln(1−a∗) . Then,
(i) There exists some increasing cost function c1 (f), satisfying c1 (0) = c01 (0) = 0, c01 strictly
convex, and Condition C, for which the first order condition (10) holds at (a∗, b∗, f∗).23
(ii) Let cm be the m-tilt of c1 about f∗. Then for m suﬃciently large, (a∗, b∗, f∗) constitutes an
interior symmetric equilibrium for the cost function cm.
One can interpret this as a relaxation of Proposition 3 which guarantees existence of a unique in-
terior equilibrium if security choices are perfectly inelastic. Proposition 7 shows that an equilibrium
exists if security choices that are suﬃciently inelastic, without guaranteeing uniqueness.
4.2.1 Comparative Statics and Network Resilience
Comparative statics of a change in security costs
In order to discuss changes in the cost of security, we temporarily write the cost with a scale
factor k:
C (z, f) = kc (f) .
If we fix the shape of the cost function c (f), then the model has only three parameters, A, B, and
k. Moreover, equilibrium behavior is determined entirely by the two ratios A/k and B/k. In this
section, we examine how equilibrium behavior, and agents’ welfare, respond to changes in those
parameters. To do this, we exploit the fact that the equilibrium conditions (10) permit us to treat a
change in any one of these parameters as a shift along a curve defined by the other two parameters.
First consider a shift in the cost of security, holding A and B fixed. From (10), we can see
that changes in k simply shift the economy along the curve AΥ (a) = BΥ (b). It is not hard to
show that the direction of this shift is unambiguous — an increase in k has the same qualitative
eﬀect that a reduction in the security capacity f¯ had in the previous section. In both cases, the
aggregate eﬀect of limiting individual security is to move the economy away from the bliss point at
(a, b) = (1, 0) and toward the no-security line b = a. As earlier, a connected and secure economy
((a, b) near (1, 0)) absorbs higher security costs both by using reduced connectivity as a security
substitute (a falls) and by accepting a higher infection rate (b rises). If costs continue to rise, the
23A suitable c1 can always be found. One example is
c1 (f) = k
µ
1
1− f + ln (1− f)− 1
¶
= k
µ
1
2
f2 +
2
3
f3 +
3
4
f4 + ...
¶
with the constant k chosen to satisfy (10).
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Figure 6: Equilibrium conditions with security cost C (f) = kc (f), c (f) = f3/ (1− f). (Condition
(11) in bold. Condition AΥ (a) = BΥ (b) shown for B = .9, 2, 30. In each case, A = 1.)
equilibrium response eventually depends on whether the harm from viruses exceeds the benefit from
tips (B ≷ A). If they do (B > A), then as k rises, agents continue to shed links as a substitute
for security (a falls), and eventually this eﬀect dominates the reduction in f , pushing down the
infection rate (b falls). However, if the harm from viruses is less severe (B < A), then increases in k
continue to be absorbed as a rise in infections (b rises). Eventually b is large enough that shedding
links becomes an ineﬀective security substitute; at this point, further increases in k begin to push
total connectivity back up (a rises).
Comparative statics with respect to the threat level B and network resilience
Next, consider the exercise of raising the threat level B, while A and k are fixed. To conserve on
notation, we absorb k back into the cost function, so we return to C (z, f) = c (f). In the inelastic
security case, we used the fixed level of security 1 − f¯ = ab ln(1−b)ln(1−a) to identify the (a, b) pairs that
could represent an equilibrium for some value of B. Here, in place of (6), we have a relationship
that balances marginal benefits and costs of security: any equilibrium must lie on the curve
AΥ (a) = k (1− f) c0 (f)¯¯
1−f=a
b
ln(1−b)
ln(1−a)
(11)
regardless of B. Examples of the curve defined by (11) are sketched in bold in Figure 6. Because
equilibrium condition (7) has not changed from the inelastic security case, the eﬀect on equilibrium
of making security more flexible can begin to be understood by looking at the change from (6)
to (11). For comparison, let us write (6) (equivalently but less succinctly) as k
¡
1− f¯¢ c0 ¡f¯¢ =
k (1− f) c0 (f)|
1−f=a
b
ln(1−b)
ln(1−a)
. Both (6) and (11) tend to (a, b) = (1, 1) as a approaches 1. Now
consider some other arbitrary point
³
aˆ, bˆ
´
lying on (6). Starting from
³
aˆ, bˆ
´
, do we need to shift
to the right or to the left to reach curve (11)? The answer depends on the equilibrium returns to
marginal connectivity AΥ (aˆ). If AΥ (aˆ) is too large and aˆ > υ¯, then individuals have the incentive
to form more links and sterilize this increase with an increase in security. This tends to shift a to
the right; because we are in the negative feedback region where AΥ0 (a) < 0, a suﬃcient shift to
the right will bring the marginal benefits from links and the marginal cost of security into balance,
satisfying (11).
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Figure 7: Non-resilience with moderately convex security costs. C (f) = kf2/ (1− f).
Alternatively, suppose instead that the marginal returns to connectivity AΥ (aˆ) are too low to
satisfy (11) at
³
aˆ, bˆ
´
and that aˆ < υ¯. Then individuals have the incentive to cut back on both
links and security. (In essence, at
³
aˆ, bˆ
´
it is less painful to cut virus exposure by cutting z than
by maintaining f .) At the individual level this makes sense, since holding a fixed, the individual
return to z, Aaˆ2e−aˆz, rises as z is reduced. However, here we are in the region of positive network
eﬀects, so when all individuals cut links, thereby reducing a, the individual return to additional
links actually falls further. In order to satisfy (11), a and f must fall suﬃciently far that declining
marginal security costs can catch up with the downward spiral of returns to connectivity. If the
security cost function is not suﬃciently convex, this may not be possible.
A complementary intuition for this last case is the following. When security is free up to a limit
f¯ , individuals do not scale back on security even as the prevalence of the virus b declines. In contrast,
when security costs are more elastic, individuals respond to a reduction in b by economizing on f ,
and this countervailing reaction can prevent b from falling too rapidly.
Figure 6 illustrates these possibilities for the cost function c (f) = k f
3
1−f .24 For low k, equation
(11) is close to linear, but for higher k, it becomes very shallow as a and b fall, reflecting the fact
that total connectivity must fall quite a long way before marginal security costs are worth bearing.
As the figure illustrates, the equilibrium comparative statics of an increase in the threat level B are
loosely similar to what we saw with inelastic security: as B rises, holding other parameters fixed,
both total and unsecured connectivity decline, with the latter tending to zero as B →∞. However,
there is an important diﬀerence. In the first two panels with lower cost parameters, the network
survives as B →∞, in the sense that a tends to a positive limit. In the last case, it does not: both
a and b vanish as B → ∞. This outcome was not possible under a positive and inelastic security
capacity f¯ , but here agents’ incentives to substitute isolation for security eﬀort lead the network
to dissolve. Motivated by Figure 6, we introduce the concept of resiliency.
Definition 3 An economy is resilient (for particular A and cost function C (f)) if there is a
sequence of symmetric equilibria in which total connectivity and payoﬀs remain positive and bounded
away from zero as the threat level B goes to infinity.
In a non-resilient economy the network may wither away smoothly with B, as in Figure 6,
24The denominator is chosen to ensure that c0 (f) and (1− f) c0 (f) grow unboundedly large as f → 1.
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or there may be a threshold threat level at which interior symmetric equilibria suddenly vanish.
Figure 7 shows the latter possibility for costs C (f) = k f
2
1−f . If costs are low relative to network
benefits (A/k = 5), then the economy is resilient: connectivity tends toward a ≈ 0.75 and payoﬀs
tend toward approximately 0.38A as B rises.25 However, if benefits are smaller relative to costs
(A/k = 3), then near B ≈ 11, the interior equilibrium collapses: connectivity falls from a ≈ 0.49
to zero, while payoﬀs drop from roughly 0.09A to zero.26 Our last result shows that these are
examples of a more general relationship between resilience and the cost of security.
Proposition 8 Fix an increasing, convex, analytic cost function C (f) = kc (f) satisfying c (0) = 0
and (1− f) c0 (f) increasing, and k > 0.
i) If c0 (0) = c00 (0) = c000 (0), then for any A > 0, the economy is resilient.
ii) If at least one of the derivatives c0 (0), c00 (0), and c000 (0) is strictly positive, then there is
some threshold L¯ > 0 such that such that the economy is not resilient if A/k < L¯.
5 Concluding Remarks
We develop a model of network formation and security in large decentralized populations and
characterize some of its important features. Among other results, we show conditions under which
equilibrium networks are overconnected (because negative externalities dominate positive ones at
equilibrium) and improvements in security technology induce equilibrium infection rates to get
worse.
While the relative simplicity of the model — aside from the shape of costs, there are only two free
parameters — makes it a useful testbed, there are many ways that it could be extended or made more
realistic. One issue is the random graph assumption. While this is a convenient modeling metaphor
for the idea that agents are too poorly informed about the network structure to fine-tune whom
they connect to, it fails in two respects. First, it is too pessimistic about agents’ information.
A natural relaxation would be to assume that an agent can see (and use in his decisions) some
information about a potential direct connection — such as the number of additional links he has —
but cannot observe connections that are more than one stage removed. The second failure of the
random graph assumption is that it cannot generate the high level of clustering that is a feature
of most known human networks. One way to improve this mismatch might involve letting the hub
play a real role in the model, rather than a merely instrumental one. If there were many small
to moderate-sized hubs, each one could act as a type of local nucleus where people congregate,
with natural interpretations in terms of clubs, internet forums, restaurants and so forth. Or, in the
context of network security, if we interpret the hub as a large interested party such as Google or the
Centers for Disease Control as suggested earlier, there may be interesting crowd-in or crowd-out
interactions between initiatives taken by the large party and the incentives of the smaller ones.
There are also a number of interesting alternative assumptions about payoﬀs to explore. Besides
the obvious fact that the creators of a virus could be promoted to full strategic status, one could
look at notions of benefits or harm that decay with distance from the originating agent. A diﬀerent
25The figure also illustrates the fact that for insuﬃciently convex costs, there may be multiple solutions to the
necessary conditions for equilibrium. We anticipate that at least some of these intersections are also equilibria but
have not confirmed this.
26One caveat is that we have not ruled out the possibility that the economy switches to an asymmetric equilibria
and some degree of network connectivity survives; additional work is required to clarify this.
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assumption that has some real-world resonance would be that benefits derive mainly from direct
contacts, but threats and viruses can skip across the whole network as in our model.
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6 Proofs
Proposition 1
Proof. Write Anh (z˜; z−1) = Prnh
¡
1↔ 0 | z˜, zn−1
¢
for the probability that agents 0 and 1
communicate in a nh-economy. Henceforth we suppress conditioning on (z˜; z−1) in the notation.
We can write
nh
Pr (1↔ 0) = nhPr (E01+H) +
nh
Pr (E01−H)
where E01+H and E01−H are the events
E01+H : 1↔ H ∩ 0↔ H , E01−H : 1↔ 0 ∩ 1= H ∩ 0= H
That is, if 0 and 1 communicate, then they are either both connected to the hub, or neither of
them is. The proof proceeds though a series of lemmas. First, Lemmas 1 and 2 establish that
limn→∞ Prnh (E01−H) = 0. That is, in a large h-economy, agents 0 and 1 never communicate with
each other unless each is also connected to the hub. Next, Lemma 3 establishes that the events
1 ↔ H and 0 ↔ H are asymptotically independent, so we have limn→∞ Prnh (E01+H) = Xh0Xh1 ,
whereXh0 = limn→∞Xnh0 andXh1 = limn→∞Xnh1 are the agents’ limiting probabilities of connecting
to H:
Xnh0 =
nh
Pr (0↔ H) , Xnh1 =
nh
Pr (1↔ H)
Lemma 4 characterizes Xh0 and X
h
1 using the branching process approximation described in the
text. We have
1−Xh0 = (1− h) e−zXh0 and 1−Xh1 = (1− h) e−z˜Xh0
For any hub size h > 0, the first equation has a unique solution with Xh0 ∈ (0, 1). (There is also
an irrelevant strictly negative solution.) Then, Xh1 is determined by X
h
0 (and z˜). The final step is
to take A (z˜; z−1) = limh→0Xh0Xh1 . Showing that Xh0 converges to zero if z ≤ 1 and to a if z > 1
completes the proof. To show this, let X0 = limh→0Xh0 . By continuity, X0 must be a solution of
1− x = e−zx .
One solution is obviously at x = 0. If z = 1, this is the unique solution; otherwise there is exactly
one additional solution which is positive (negative) if z > 1 (z < 1). (If one plots the equation,
this is obvious. To be a bit more careful, note that the function ν (x) = 1 − x − e−zx is strictly
concave, approaches −∞ as x → ∞ or x → −∞, and satisfies ν (0) = 0 and ν0 (0) = z − 1. Thus
if z − 1 > 0, ν (x) = 0 has exactly one additional positive solution, and conversely if z < 1.) This
immediately implies (since Xh0 > 0 for all h > 0) that X0 = 0 if z ≤ 1.
Finally, suppose that z > 1. In this case, Xh0 must converge either to zero, or to the positive
solution a. But Lemma 5 shows that Xh0 can be bounded away from zero uniformly for all h. Thus,
we must have X0 = a, as claimed.
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Lemma 1 Let Si be the set of agents who are reachable from agent i, including i herself, without
using any links to or from H. Let Lgi (respectively Smi) be the event |Si| > logn (respectively
|Si| ≤ logn ). Then limn→∞ Prnh ¡i= H ∩ Lgi | z˜, zn−1¢ = 0.
Proof. Here and elsewhere, we suppress the conditioning on z˜, zn−1 in the notation.Write
Prnh (i= H ∩ Lgi) = Prnh (i= H |Lgi) Prnh (Lgi) ≤ Prnh (i= H |Lgi). The event i = H is
equivalent to ηj = 0 for all j ∈ Si, so we have
nh
Pr (i= H |Lgi) ≤ (1− h)logn = nlog(1−h)
Since log (1− h) is negative, the final expression converges to 0 with n, which suﬃces to prove the
lemma.
Lemma 2 Let E01−H be the event 1↔ 0 ∩1= H ∩0= H. Then limn→∞ Prnh ¡E01−H | z˜, zn−1¢ =
0.
Proof. Write Prnh (E01−H) = Prnh (E01−H ∩ Sm1) + Prnh (E01−H ∩ Lg1) and note that
Prnh (E01−H ∩ Lg1) tends to zero with n by Lemma 1. For the first term, observe that
nh
Pr (E01−H ∩ Sm1) =
nh
Pr (E01−H |Sm1)
nh
Pr (Sm1) ≤
nh
Pr (E01−H |Sm1) ≤
nh
Pr (0 ∈ S1 |Sm1)
Given the symmetric strategy profile for all agents other than 1, agent 0 has the same chance as
any other agent of belonging to S1, so Prnh (0 ∈ S1 |Sm1) ≤ logn−1n−1 . Thus, Prnh (E01−H ∩ Sm1)
also tends to zero with n, completing the proof.
Lemma 3 limn→∞
¯¯
Prnh
¡
1↔ H ∩ 0↔ H | z˜, zn−1
¢− Prnh ¡1↔ H | z˜, zn−1¢Prnh ¡0↔ H | z˜, zn−1¢¯¯ =
0.
Proof. We will prove the equivalent statement
lim
n→∞
¯¯¯¯
nh
Pr (1= H ∩ 0= H)− nhPr (1= H) nhPr (0= H)
¯¯¯¯
= 0 .
Let Ei be the event i= H ∩ Smi for i = 0, 1. By Lemma 1, it suﬃces to prove that¯¯¯¯
nh
Pr (E0 ∩E1)−
nh
Pr (E0)
nh
Pr (E1)
¯¯¯¯
tends to zero with n. Furthermore, since we have Prnh (E0 ∩E1) = Prnh (E0 |E1) Prnh (E1), it is
enough to show that Prnh (E0 |E1) converges to Prnh (E0). To show this, construct independent
copies
³
ζ 0ij , η0j
´
of all of the link random variables, and let G0 be the graph generated by these
variables. Let G00 be the graph generated by using:
ζij if i ∈ S1 or j ∈ S1 ; otherwise, use ζ 0ij
ηj if j ∈ S1 ; otherwise use η0j
That is, G00 coincides with the original graph G for links to and from agents who are in S1 but
follows the copies for other links. Define S00, S000 , Sm00, and Sm000 for G0 and G00 just as S0 and Sm0
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were defined for G, and let E00 and E000 be the events corresponding to E0. By construction, graphs
G and G0 are independent, so we have
nh
Pr
¡
E00 |E1
¢
=
nh
Pr
¡
E00
¢
=
nh
Pr (E0) .
We also have E001 = E1 and
nh
Pr
¡
E000 |E1
¢
=
nh
Pr (E0 |E1) .
so to establish the lemma, it suﬃces to show that Prnh (E00 |E1)−Prnh (E000 |E1) tends to zero with
n. Let Sˆ00 be the set of agents who are reachable in G0 from agent 0, including herself, when links
to or from H and links to or from agents in S1 are excluded. Define Sˆ000 similarly for G00, and note
that the sets Sˆ00 and Sˆ000 are identical; write Sˆ0 = Sˆ00 = Sˆ000 . Whenever there are no links between
the sets Sˆ0 and S1 in either G0 or G00, the events E00 and E000 must coincide, as they are determined
both determined by the same set of (copy) random variables. Furthermore, whenever
¯¯¯
Sˆ0
¯¯¯
> logn,
the chance of either E00 or E000 must be each tending to zero with n by Lemma 1. Thus,¯¯¯¯
nh
Pr
¡
E00 |E1
¢− nhPr ¡E000 |E1¢¯¯¯¯ ≤ nhPr
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝ [
(i,j)∈Sˆ0×S1
¡ζ 0ij = 1 ∪ ζij = 1¢
⎞
⎠ ∩
¯¯¯
Sˆ0
¯¯¯
≤ logn |E1
⎞
⎠+ o (1)
≤ nhPr
⎛
⎝ [
(i,j)∈Sˆ0×S1
¡ζ 0ij = 1 ∪ ζij = 1¢ |E1 ∩ ¯¯¯Sˆ0 ¯¯¯ ≤ logn
⎞
⎠+ o (1)
≤ nhPr
⎛
⎝ [
(i,j)∈Sˆ0×S1
¡ζ 0ij = 1¢ |E1 ∩ ¯¯¯Sˆ0 ¯¯¯ ≤ logn
⎞
⎠
+
nh
Pr
⎛
⎝ [
(i,j)∈Sˆ0×S1
¡ζij = 1¢ |E1 ∩ ¯¯¯Sˆ0 ¯¯¯ ≤ logn
⎞
⎠+ o (1)
≤ 2δ (logn)
2
n
+ o (1)
where we define δ = max(z,z˜)2min(z,z˜) . The first line simply defines the probability of a link between the sets
Sˆ0 and S1 in either G0 or G00. The second step applies the fact that Pr (x ∩ y) = Pr (x | y) Pr (y) ≤
Pr (x | y). The third step uses the inclusion-exclusion principle. The last step uses the inclusion-
exclusion principle again, along with the conditioning on both sets having at most logn elements
and the fact that the probability of a direct link between any particular pair of agents is bounded
above by δn . The final expression tends to zero as n→∞, and this completes the proof.
Lemma 4 Let Xnh0 = Pr
nh
¡
0↔ H | z˜, zn−1
¢
and Xnh1 = Pr
nh
¡
1↔ H | z˜, zn−1
¢
as in Proposition 1.
Define Yˆ h0 as the positive solution to
Yˆ h0 = (1− h) e−z(1−Yˆ h0 ) .
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Then
lim
n→∞X
nh
0 = 1− Yˆ h0 and
lim
n→∞X
nh
1 = 1− (1− h) e−z˜(1−Yˆ h0 ) .
Proof. As discussed in the text, we proceed by deriving the complementary probability of
0= H. We omit a derivation of the probability of 1= H, as the arguments involved are identical
to the 0= H case.
Let
³
Rˆt, Wˆt
´
be the branching process described in the text. We will couple
³
Rˆt, Wˆt
´
to a
second stochastic process (Rt,Wt) such that (i) the second process must eventually die out at
some generation, say T , (ii) RT correctly enumerates the members of S0, and (iii)
¯¯¯
Rˆt
¯¯¯
≥ |Rt| and¯¯¯
Wˆt
¯¯¯
≥ |Wt| for all t ≥ 0.
Let ζij refer to the true random variables that generate G, and let ζˆij be an independent copy
of ζij , with the understanding that every reference to ζˆij implies that a new independent copy is
drawn. When we need to refer to an arbitrary individual of type i, we write i#. Put Rˆ0 = ∅ and
Wˆ0 = {0#} as in the text. We generate Wˆt+1 as described in the text, with the following provisos.
Suppose that every individual in Rˆt ∪ Wˆt has been tagged as either legitimate or illegitimate. In
particular, the unique member of Wˆ0 is legitimate. For each parent i# ∈ Wˆt and each type j of
potential child that i# could generate :
If i# is illegitimate or if there is a legitimate type j individual in Rˆt ∪ Wˆt, then
- Generate the type j child according to an independent copy ζˆij .
- If the child is created, tag her as illegitimate.
If i# is legitimate and there is no legitimate type j individual in Rˆt ∪ Wˆt, then
- Generate the type j child according to ζij .
- If the child is created, leave her untagged for the moment.
After this step, the members of set Wˆt+1 have been created. Next return to the untagged
members of Wˆt+1. For each type j, rank the untagged type j individuals in Wˆt+1 by parent’s type,
from lowest to highest. Declare the first individual in this list to be legitimate (if she exists) and
any other individuals to be illegitimate.
Define R0 = ∅, Rt+1 = Rt∪Wt, andWt =
n
i# | i# ∈ Wˆt and i# is legitimate
o
. Clearly property
(iii) holds by construction. Also by construction, at most one individual of each type is ever tagged
as legitimate. This implies that Rt contains at most one individual of each type, and that (Rt,Wt)
must die oﬀ within at most n generations (so property (i) holds). Finally, we claim that the types
of the individuals in RT enumerate the agents in S0. By construction, W1 contains the first order
small neighbors of agent 0. At each subsequent step Wt generates (according to the probabilities
ζij) those tth order small neighbors of 0 who have not been counted at an earlier step. If we reach
agent j simultaneously along several separate length t paths, then we only add him to Wt once
(arbitrarily keeping the copy with the lower ranking parent.)
Finally, endow each individual in Wˆt with an i.i.d. binary random variable with probability
of success h. Specifically, for each individual j# ∈ Wˆt, assign ηj# = ηj if j# is legitimate or use
independent copy ηj# = ηˆj if j# is illegitimate. Likewise, individual j# ∈ Wt gets the random
variable ηj . The event ES0 = 0 = H is equivalent to
³
ηj# = 0 for all j# ∈ RT
´
. By analogy,
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define the event for which the branching process starting with 0 fails to connect to H as EB =³
ηj# = 0 for all j# ∈
S∞
t=0 Wˆt
´
. Clearly, by construction, we have EB ⊆ ES0 , so Prnh (ES0) =
Prnh (EB) + Pr
nh (ES0\EB). We intend to show that the probability of the event E∗ = ES0\EB
(that is, the branching process connects to H, but the true process does not) vanishes as n→∞.
Toward this end, partition E∗ as E∗ = (E∗ ∩ Sm0) ∪ (E∗ ∩ Lg0), so we have
nh
Pr (E∗) =
nh
Pr (E∗ ∩ Sm0) +
nh
Pr (E∗ ∩ Lg0)
Intuitively, the first term vanishes because (Rt,Wt) and
³
Rˆt, Wˆt
´
are very likely to coincide if S0 is
small, in which case E∗ is null. If S0 is large, then it doesn’t matter whether (Rt,Wt) and
³
Rˆt, Wˆt
´
coincide because both processes are very likely to hit H, so the chance of event E∗ is still small.
We present these arguments as two claims.
Claim: limn→∞ Prnh (E∗ ∩ Sm0) = 0
A prerequisite for events ES0 and EB to diﬀer is that process
³
Rˆt, Wˆt
´
generates at least
one illegitimate individual. A necessary condition for the first illegitimacy in
³
Rˆt, Wˆt
´
to occur
is that a legitimate parent (who is thus in S0) generates a child whose tagged as illegitimate.
A necessary condition for this child to be tagged as illegitimate is that his type appears in S0.
There are at most |S0|2 potential parent-child pairings that could create the first illegitimacy, and
each of these potential pairings has probability no greater than δn of generating the child. Thus,
conditional on |S0|, the probability that ES0 and EB diﬀer is bounded above by δ|S0|
2
n . It follows
that Prnh (E∗ |Sm0) ≤ δ(logn)2n , which justifies the claim.
Claim: limn→∞ Prnh (E∗ ∩ Lg0) = 0
Because E∗ ⊆ ES0 , it suﬃces to show that limn→∞Prnh (ES0 ∩ Lg0) = 0, but this follows from
Lemma 1.
The last two claims give us limn→∞ Prnh (E∗) = 0, so as a result, we have limn→∞
¡
Prnh (ES0)− Prnh (EB)
¢
=
0. Thus, in order to calculate the limiting probability of 0= H, it suﬃces to calculate the limiting
probability Yˆ h0 that the branching process starting at 0 fails to hit H; the derivation of Yˆ
h
0 is in
the text.
Lemma 5 For h ≥ 0 and z > 1, let x∗ (h) be the unique positive solution to ν (x) = 0 for
ν (x) ≡ 1− x− (1− h) e−zx. Then x∗ (h) > δz > 0, for all h ≥ 0, where δz = log zz does not depend
on h.
Proof. Clearly ν (x)→ −∞ as x→∞, so it suﬃces to show that ν (δz) > 0 for all h ≥ 0. We
have
ν (δz) = z − 1− log z
z
+
h
z
≥ z − 1− log z
z
for all h ≥ 0
Proposition 2
Proof. The structure of the proof is similar to Proposition 1; we will focus on the novel
features, occasionally omitting details that pass through unchanged. Write Bnh
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´
=
Prnh
³
0 7−→ 1 |
³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´
. Henceforth conditioning on the strategy profile is suppressed.
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Let E be the event (0 7−→ H ∩H 7−→ 1) and let Ec be its complement; we have Prnh (0 7−→ 1) =
Prnh (0 7−→ 1 ∩ E) + Prnh (0 7−→ 1 ∩ Ec) = Prnh (E) + Prnh (0 7−→ 1 ∩ Ec), where the last step
follows because E implies 0 7−→ 1. Note that Ec = 0 67−→ H ∪H 67−→ 1, so by the inclusion-exclusion
principle, we have
nh
Pr (0 7−→ 1) = nhPr (E) + nhPr (0 7−→ 1 ∩ 0 67−→ H) + nhPr (0 7−→ 1 ∩ H 67−→ 1)
− nhPr (0 7−→ 1 ∩ 0 67−→ H ∩H 67−→ 1)
The last three terms involve events in which agent 0 infects agent 1 via some path that does not
include the hub; Lemma 6 shows that these terms vanish as n→∞. Lemma 7 shows that 0 7−→ H
andH 7−→ 1 are asymptotically independent, so we have limn→∞ Prnh (0 7−→ 1) = bhβh, where bh =
limn→∞ Prnh (0 7−→ H) and βh = limn→∞ Prnh (H 7−→ 1). Lemma 8 adapts the branching process
approximation from Proposition 1 to accomodate the firewall random variables, demonstrating that
bh and βh solve
1− bh = (1− h) e−z(1−f)bh and 1− βh = (1− h) e−z˜(1−f˜)bh .
The final step of taking the h→ 0 limit proceeds just as in Proposition 1.
Lemma 6 Define event E = (0 7−→ H ∩H 7−→ 1) as in Proposition 2. Then,
lim
n→∞
nh
Pr (0 7−→ 1) = lim
n→∞
nh
Pr (E) .
Proof. Following the argument in the proof of Proposition 1, we have
nh
Pr (0 7−→ 1) = nhPr (E) + nhPr ¡Ec1¢+ nhPr ¡Ec2¢− nhPr ¡Ec3¢
where Ec1 = 0 7−→ 1 ∩H 67−→ 1, Ec2 = 0 7−→ 1 ∩ 0 67−→ H, and Ec3 = 0 7−→ 1 ∩ 0 67−→ H ∩H 67−→ 1.
Observe that Ec3 ⊆ Ec1 and Ec3 ⊆ Ec2, so it suﬃces to show that Prnh ¡Ec1¢ and Prnh ¡Ec2¢ each
tend to zero as n→∞.
By analogy with Si, define S
up
i to be the set of agents who infect i by some path that does not
include H. That is j ∈ Supi if and only if j 7−→1 i or j 7−→1 k1 7−→1 ... 7−→1 km 7−→1 i for some
path that does not include H. Define Sdowni to be the set of agents whom i infects along some path
that does not include H.
Claim: limn→∞ Prnh
¡
Ec1
¢
= 0
Event Ec1 is equivalent to 0 ∈ Sup1 ∩ H 67−→ 1. Partition Ec1 based on the number of up-
stream neighbors that agent 1 has: Prnh
¡
Ec1
¢
= Prnh (0 ∈ Sup1 ∩ H 67−→ 1 ∩ |Sup1 | ≤ logn) +
Prnh (0 ∈ Sup1 ∩ H 67−→ 1 ∩ |Sup1 | > logn). The second term counts events in which at least logn
agents fail to connect to H (since otherwise we would have H 7−→ 1). This has probability no
greater than (1− h)logn, which vanishes as n→∞. For the first term, note that by symmetry all
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agents in N\1 are equally likely to appear in Sup1 , so conditional on |Sup1 | ≤ logn, the chance of
0 ∈ Sup1 is no greater than logn−1n−1 , which also tends to zero with n.
Claim: limn→∞ Prnh
¡
Ec2
¢
= 0
In this case, we have Ec2 = 1 ∈ Sdown0 ∩ 0 67−→ H. Split Ec2 based on the size of Sdown0 :
nh
Pr
¡
Ec2
¢
=
nh
Pr
³
1 ∈ Sdown0 ∩ 0 67−→ H ∩
¯¯¯
Sdown0
¯¯¯
≤ logn
´
+
nh
Pr
³
1 ∈ Sdown0 ∩ 0 67−→ H ∩
¯¯¯
Sdown0
¯¯¯
> logn
´
The second term vanishes by the same argument as the second term in the previous claim. (If 0
infects more than logn agents, then the chance that none of them connects to H is small.) For
the first term, we adapt the symmetry argument from the previous claim. We have 1 ∈ Sdown0
only if j 7−→1 1 for some j ∈ Sdown0 . For any arbitrary agent j ∈ N\1, the probability that j
directly infects 1 is no greater than δn , where δ = max(z,z˜)
2
min(z,z˜) as defined earlier. Then, conditional on¯¯
Sdown0
¯¯ ≤ logn, the probability that at least one of the agents in Sdown0 directly infects 1 is thus
no greater than δ lognn . So the first term above is bounded above by
δ logn
n , and therefore tends to
zero with n.
Lemma 7 limn→∞
¯¯
Prnh (0 67−→ H ∩H 67−→ 1)− Prnh (0 67−→ H) Prnh (H 67−→ 1)¯¯ = 0.
Proof. The procedure is similar to Lemma 3. By now standard arguments, it suﬃces to show
that limn→∞
¯¯¯
Prnh
³
E˜0 ∩ E˜1
´
− Prnh
³
E˜0
´
Prnh
³
E˜1
´¯¯¯
= 0, where E˜0 = 0 67−→ H ∩ ¯¯Sdown0 ¯¯ ≤ logn
and E˜1 = H 67−→ 1∩|Sup1 | ≤ logn. Let
³
ζ 0ij , η0j ,φ0ij
´
be independent copies of the variables that gen-
erate Gf , and let Gf 0 be the secured network that they generate. Let E˜00 be the counterpart of E˜00 on
graph Gf 0. Clearly events E˜00 and E˜1 are independent, so Prnh
³
E˜00 ∩ E˜1
´
= Prnh
³
E˜00
´
Prnh
³
E˜1
´
.
Let Gf 00 be the graph generated by using:
ζij if i ∈ Sup1 or j ∈ Sup1 ; otherwise, use ζ 0ij
ηj if j ∈ Sup1 ; otherwise use η0j
φij if j ∈ Sup1 ; otherwise use φ0ij
In other words, Gf 00 uses the original random variables to determine which agents are upstream of
agent 1 and then switches to the copy random variables for all other links and firewalls. Let E˜000 be
the counterpart of E˜0 on Gf 00. Note that Prnh
³
E˜000 ∩ E˜1
´
= Prnh
³
E˜0 ∩ E˜1
´
. Now compare event
E˜00 on graph Gf 0 with event E˜000 on graph Gf 00. Let Sˆdown0 be the set of small agents who are infected
by agent 0 (in either Gf 0 or Gf 00 — it is the same set of agents for both graphs) if links to H and
links to agents in Sup1 are excluded. If
¯¯¯
Sˆdown0
¯¯¯
> logn or |Sup1 | then events E˜000 ∩ E˜1 and E˜00 ∩ E˜1
coincide. (They both fail.) Furthermore, whenever neither Gf 0 nor Gf 00 contains an unblocked link
from Sˆdown0 into S
up
1 , then E˜
0
0 and E˜
00
0 coincide, since in this case they are both determined by the
same set of copy variables
³
ζ 0ij , η0j ,φ0ij
´
. Thus,
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¯¯¯¯
nh
Pr
³
E˜000 ∩ E˜1
´
− nhPr
³
E˜00 ∩ E˜1
´¯¯¯¯
≤ nhPr
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
Ã
Gf 0 has an unblocked link from Sˆdown0 into Sup1 ∪
Gf 00 has an unblocked link from Sˆdown0 into Sup1
!
∩
³¯¯¯
Sˆdown0
¯¯¯
≤ logn
´
∩ (|Sup1 | ≤ logn)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
≤ 2 nhPr
⎛
⎝
³
Gf 0 has an unblocked link from Sˆdown0 into Sup1
´
∩
³¯¯¯
Sˆdown0
¯¯¯
≤ logn
´
∩ (|Sup1 | ≤ logn)
⎞
⎠
≤ 2δ (logn)
2
n
Since the righthand side tends to zero with n, we have
lim
n→∞
nh
Pr
³
E˜0 ∩ E˜1
´
= lim
n→∞
nh
Pr
³
E˜000 ∩ E˜1
´
= lim
n→∞
nh
Pr
³
E˜00 ∩ E˜1
´
= lim
n→∞
nh
Pr
³
E˜00
´
lim
n→∞
nh
Pr
³
E˜1
´
= lim
n→∞
nh
Pr
³
E˜0
´
lim
n→∞
nh
Pr
³
E˜1
´
as claimed.
Lemma 8 Given strategy profile
³³
z˜, f˜
´
; (z, f)−1
´
in which agent 1 plays
³
z˜, f˜
´
and every other
agent plays (z, f), we have
lim
n→∞
nh
Pr (0 67−→ H) = 1− bh
lim
n→∞
nh
Pr (H 67−→ 1) = 1− βh1
where bh is the positive solution to
1− bh = (1− h) e−z(1−f)bh
and
βh1 = 1− (1− h) e−z˜(1−f˜)bh
Proof. As the proof is quite similar to the proof of Lemma 4, we focus on highlighting the
diﬀerences. To determine limn→∞ Prnh (0 67−→ H), define
³
Rˆdownt , Wˆ
down
t
´
with reproduction rates
as in the text. Here, φij will refer to the true firewall random variables that determine Gf , while
φˆij will be independent copies of these random variables. As in the proof of Lemma 4, we couple³
Rˆdownt , Wˆ
down
t
´
to Gf by using the true, unhatted variables when enumerating members of Sdown0
for the first time and switching to independent copies when we begin to generate duplicates of those
members. Put Rˆdown0 = ∅ and Wˆ down0 = {0#}, and tag this initial type 0 individual as legitimate.
At stage t + 1, assume that all individuals in Rˆdownt ∪ Wˆ downt have been tagged. For each parent
i# ∈ Wˆ downt and each type j of potential child that i# could generate :
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If i# is illegitimate or if there is a legitimate type j individual in Rˆdownt ∪ Wˆ downt , then
- Generate the type j child if ζˆij
³
1− φˆij
´
= 1.
- If the child is created, tag her as illegitimate.
If i# is legitimate and there is no legitimate type j individual in Rˆdownt ∪ Wˆ downt , then
- Generate the type j child if ζij
¡
1− φij
¢
= 1.
- If the child is created, leave her untagged for the moment.
The children created at this stage are the members of Wˆ downt+1 . Return to the untagged members
of this set and tag them as legitimate or illegitimate as in Lemma 4. Define Rdown0 = ∅, Rdownt+1 =
Rdownt ∪W downt , and W downt =
n
i# | i# ∈ Wˆ downt and i# is legitimate
o
. By the same logic as in
Lemma 4, Rdownt must cease growing by some finite T , and the types of the individuals in RT
enumerate the agents in Sdown0 . From here, one follows Lemma 4 more or less line for line. Yˆ
down,nh
0
(the probability that no individual created in the branching process
³
Rˆdownt , Wˆ
down
t
´
hits H) and
Prnh (0 67−→ H) can diﬀer only over events in which no agent in Sdown0 hits H but Rˆdownt eventually
contains some illegitimate agent who does hit H. As n → ∞, these events almost never occur,
either because the creation of an illegitimate individual is very unlikely (if Sdown0 turns out to be
small relative to n) or because some agent in Sdown0 is almost certain to hit H (if S
down
0 turns out
to be large relative to n). Thus we have 1 − bh = limn→∞ Prnh (0 67−→ H) = Yˆ down,h0 . As shown
in the text, Yˆ down,h0 solves Yˆ
down,h
0 = (1− h) e−z(1−f)
³
1−Yˆ down,h0
´
, from which the first part of the
lemma follows.
Determining limn→∞ Prnh (H 67−→ 1), involves an essentially identical argument. In this case,
we use the branching process
³
Rˆupt , Wˆ
up
t
´
, initialized with Rˆdown0 = ∅ and Wˆ down0 = {1#}, and we
couple the process to Sup1 by assigning random variables as follows. For each parent i# ∈ Wˆupt and
each type j of potential child that i# could generate :
If i# is illegitimate or if there is a legitimate type j individual in Rˆ
up
t ∪ Wˆupt , then
- Generate the type j child if ζˆij
³
1− φˆji
´
= 1.
- If the child is created, tag her as illegitimate.
If i# is legitimate and there is no legitimate type j individual in Rˆ
up
t ∪ Wˆupt , then
- Generate the type j child if ζij
¡
1− φji
¢
= 1.
- If the child is created, wait until all members of Wˆupt+1 have been generated, and then tag
her as in Lemma 4.
The only diﬀerence from the
³
Rˆdownt , Wˆ
down
t
´
case is the reversal of subscripts on the firewall
variables, indicating that we create the child j upstream of parent i only if the parent’s firewall
variable φji (or φˆji) equals 1. One proceeds just as for the downstream case to show that 1− βh1 =
limn→∞ Prnh (H 67−→ 1) = Yˆ up,h1 . The conclusion that βh1 = 1− (1− h) e−z˜(1−f˜)bh follows from the
argument in the text.
Proposition 3
Proof. The first condition follows from setting z˜ = z in agent 1’s first order condition with
respect to z˜ and using the identities a = 1 − e−az and b = 1 − e−(1−f¯)zb. The second condition
follows from those two identities. The argument in the text establishes that these two conditions
are necessary and suﬃcient for an equilibrium. It remains to show that this pair of equations has
a unique solution on (a, b) ∈ (0, 1)2 , b ≤ a.
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For brevity, let D denote the triangular region
n
(a, b) | (a, b) ∈ (0, 1)2 , b < a
o
and D¯ its closure.
We start with a few remarks on the curves defined by the two conditions. Let g (x) = − ln(1−x)x ,
and note that g is a positive, strictly increasing, and continuous function on (−∞, 1) with g (0) = 1
and limx→∞ g (x) =∞. Let a > 0 be defined (uniquely) by ¡1− f¯¢ g (a) = 1. Since g is invertible,
for the second equilibrium condition we can write b as a strictly increasing function of a: b = γ (a),
with γ (x) = g−1 ¡¡1− f¯¢ g (x)¢. The pair (a, b) = (a, γ (a)) satisfies condition (6) and lies in D if
and only if a ∈ (a, 1). (If a ≤ a, γ (a) ≤ 0.) To the southwest end of D, (a, γ (a)) tends toward
(a, 0), while to the northeast, (a, γ (z)) tends toward (1, 1). Next, we claim that γ0 (a) tends to
infinity as a → 1. For this, it suﬃces to show that lima→1 1−γ(a)1−a = ∞. With a bit of algebra,
we can write ln
³
1−γ(a)
1−a
´
=
³¡
1− f¯¢ γ(a)a − 1´ ln (1− a). The term in parentheses tends to −f¯ as
a→ 1, while ln (1− a) tends to −∞, so we have lima→1 ln
³
1−γ(a)
1−a
´
=∞, so a fortiori, 1−γ(a)1−a tends
to infinity also.
Next we turn to the first condition, Aa2 (1− a) = Bb2 (1− b) ¡1− f¯¢. We can write this
as Aχ (a) = B ¡1− f¯¢χ (b), where χ (x) = x2 (1− x). Note that χ has an inverse-U shape on
x ∈ (0, 1), with a range of (0, 427 ] and its single peak at x = 23 . For each y ∈
¡
0, 427
¢
, y = χ (x) has
two solutions for x ∈ (0, 1); one to the left and one to the right of x = 23 . Let χ−1− (y) and χ−1+ (y)
denote these two solutions. (That is, χ ¡χ−1− (y)¢ = χ ¡χ−1+ (y)¢ = y, with χ−1− (y) < 23 < χ−1+ (y).)
There are three cases, depending on whether A S B
¡
1− f¯¢.
A < B
¡
1− f¯¢ In this case, consider a solution to the condition for arbitrary a0 ∈ (0, 1). Any
satisfactory b0 must satisfy χ (b0) = y0, where y0 = A
B(1−f¯)χ (a0) ∈ (0, 427 AB(1−f¯) ]. There are two
solutions, call them b− and b+. Notice that y0 < χ (a0), so b− must lie to the left of χ−1− (χ (a0))
and b+ must lie to the right of χ−1+ (χ (a0)). But this implies that b− < a0 < b+, so only the smaller
solution (a0, b−) lies in D. Since this is true for arbitrary a0 ∈ (0, 1), for this case, all solutions
to condition (5) on D take the form
½
(a, b) | a ∈ (0, 1) , b = χ−1−
µ
A
B(1−f¯)χ (a)
¶¾
. Observe that
χ−1− (y) is increasing in y and that χ−1− (0) = 0. Thus, this solution approaches (a, b) = (0, 0) as
a → 0 or (1, 0) as a → 1, and b is first increasing in a (since A
B(1−f¯)χ (a) is increasing for a < 23)
and then decreasing (for a > 23).
A > B
¡
1− f¯¢ For this case, the roles of a and b are reversed: a is an inverse-U shaped function
of b. To see this, pick an arbitrary b0 ∈ (0, 1) and consider candidate solutions a0 that solve
χ (a0) = B(1−f¯)A χ (b0) < 427 . Again, there are two solutions, a− = χ−1−
µ
B(1−f¯)
A χ (b0)
¶
and a+ =
χ−1+
µ
B(1−f¯)
A χ (b0)
¶
. In this case, because
B(1−f¯)
A < 1, we have χ (a+) = χ (a−) < χ (b0), so
a− < b0 < a+. The only candidate solution lying in D is a+, so solutions to condition (5) must take
the form
½
(a, b) | b ∈ (0, 1) , a = χ−1+
µ
B(1−f¯)
A χ (b)
¶¾
. Because χ−1+ (0) = 1, this solution tends to
(a, b) = (1, 0) or (1, 1) as b→ 0 or b→ 1. Furthermore, since χ−1+ (y) is decreasing in y, the solution
has a first decreasing (for b < 23) and then increasing (for b >
2
3) in b.
A = B
¡
1− f¯¢ For this boundary case, we have a2 (1− a) = b2 (1− b). The solution a = b does
not lie in D. The only other solutions, parametrized by y ∈ (0, 427 ], are (a, b) =
¡χ−1− (y) ,χ−1+ (y)¢
or (a, b) =
¡χ−1+ (y) ,χ−1− (y)¢. Only the latter lies in D. Its endpoints tend toward (a, b) = (1, 0)
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as y → 0 and (a, b) = ¡23 , 23¢ as y → 427 .
Now we can turn to first existence and then uniqueness, case by case.
Existence
A < B
¡
1− f¯¢ Each equilibrium condition determines b as a continuous function of a. Define the
diﬀerence between these functions: ν (a) = χ−1−
µ
A
B(1−f¯)χ (a)
¶
− γ (a) for a ∈ [a, 1]. We have
ν (a) > 0 and ν (1) = −1, so by continuity there exists some pair (a, b) ∈ D (with a ∈ (a, 1)) that
satisfies both equilibrium conditions simultaneously.
A = B
¡
1− f¯¢ This is identical to the previous case, but define ν on a ∈ £max ¡a, 23¢ , 1¤. If a > 23 ,
then γ (a) = 0 implies ν (a) > 0. If 23 ≥ a, then χ−1−
¡χ ¡23¢¢ = 23 and γ (a) < a imply ν ¡23¢ > 0. As
above, we have lima→1 ν (a) = −1, so some (a, b) ∈ D satisfying both equilibrium conditions must
exist.
A > B
¡
1− f¯¢ In this case, both conditions can be framed to express a as a continuous function of
b. Define the diﬀerence μ (b) = χ−1+
µ
B(1−f¯)
A χ (b)
¶
−γ−1 (b), and note that limb→0 μ (b) = 1−a > 0.
Furthermore, we have limb→1 μ (b) = 0 and we claim that limb→1 μ0 (b) > 0. This implies that μ (b)
is strictly negative for b suﬃciently close to 1, and therefore that μ (b) has a zero for some b ∈ (0, 1).
This establishes existence of an equilibrium. For the claim on μ0 (b), we showed earlier that γ0 (a)
tends to ∞ (and so dγ−1(b)db → 0) as a and b tend to 1, so it suﬃces to show that dadb is strictly
positive along condition (5) as a and b approach 1. It is straightforward to show (use the implicit
function theorem) that in fact dadb → B(1−f¯)A > 0 as (a, b)→ (1, 1) along the solution for condition
(5).
Uniqueness
A < B
¡
1− f¯¢ We will show that if ν (aˆ) = 0, then ν0 (aˆ) < 0. Thus ν (a) has at most one zero
on a ∈ (0, 1), and therefore the economy has at most one equilibrium. Suppose that we have an
equilibrium (aˆ, b∗) with bˆ = γ (aˆ) and ν (aˆ) = 0. Direct computations show that
ν 0 (aˆ) = 1
1− f¯
Aaˆ (2− 3aˆ)
Bbˆ
³
2− 3bˆ
´ − ¡1− f¯¢ bˆ2
³
1− bˆ
´
aˆ2 (1− aˆ)
aˆ+ (1− aˆ) ln (1− aˆ)
bˆ+
³
1− bˆ
´
ln
³
1− bˆ
´
Using both equilibrium conditions, this may be rewritten as
ν0 (aˆ) = A
B
ln (1− aˆ)
ln
³
1− bˆ
´
⎛
⎝2− 3aˆ
2− 3bˆ −
ω (aˆ)
ω
³
bˆ
´
⎞
⎠
where ω (x) = 1−x+ xln(1−x) . Note that because bˆ = χ−1−
µ
A
B(1−f¯)χ (aˆ)
¶
, we must have 2−3bˆ > 0.
One can show computationally that ω (x) is strictly negative on x ∈ (0, 1), decreasing on x ∈ (0, x¯),
and increasing on x ∈ (x¯, 1), where x¯ ≈ 0.83359. Thus for aˆ < 23 , because bˆ < aˆ we have 2−3aˆ2−3bˆ < 1
and ω(aˆ)ω(bˆ) > 1, so the term in parentheses is strictly negative. For aˆ ≥ 23 , we have 2−3aˆ2−3bˆ ≤ 0 and
ω(aˆ)
ω(bˆ)
strictly positive, so again, the term in parentheses is strictly negative. This shows that ν0 (aˆ) < 0.
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A = B
¡
1− f¯¢ In this case, any equilibrium ³aˆ, bˆ´ must satisfy aˆ > 23 and bˆ < 23 . The argument
in the previous case for aˆ > 23 applies directly to show that ν (aˆ) < 0.
A > B
¡
1− f¯¢ The general idea remains the same, but here we need to show that μ0 (aˆ) < 0 at
any equilibrium aˆ. Substituting equilibrium conditions into μ0 (aˆ) as above, we have
μ0 (aˆ) = ¡1− f¯¢ Bbˆ
³
2− 3bˆ
´
Aaˆ (2− 3aˆ) −
⎛
⎝¡1− f¯¢ bˆ2
³
1− bˆ
´
aˆ2 (1− aˆ)
aˆ+ (1− aˆ) ln (1− aˆ)
bˆ+
³
1− bˆ
´
ln
³
1− bˆ
´
⎞
⎠
−1
=
B
A
ln
³
1− bˆ
´
ln (1− aˆ)
⎛
⎝ 2− 3bˆ
2− 3aˆ −
ω
³
bˆ
´
ω (aˆ)
⎞
⎠
In this case, any equilibrium has aˆ > 23 , so if bˆ ≤ 23 , we have 2−3bˆ2−3aˆ ≤ 0, so we are done. If bˆ > 23 ,
then write
μ0 (aˆ) = B
A
ln
³
1− bˆ
´
ln (1− aˆ)
2− 3bˆ
2− 3aˆ
⎛
⎝1−
ω
³
bˆ
´
2− 3bˆ
Á ω (aˆ)
2− 3aˆ
⎞
⎠
One can show computationally that the function ω(x)2−3x is positive and strictly decreasing for x ∈
(0, 1), so since we have 23 < bˆ < aˆ, the term in parentheses is negative, and thus μ0 (aˆ) < 0.
Proposition 4
Proof. We have dπeq
df¯
= 2Aa da
df¯
− 2Bb db
df¯
. Throughout the proof, we will appeal to a number of
facts about equilibrium that are summarized in Lemma 9. If f¯ is suﬃciently high, then (by Lemma
9) we have da
df¯
positive and db
df¯
negative, so we are done. Otherwise, diﬀerentiate the equilibrium
identity AΥ (a) = BΥ (b) to get AΥ0 (a) da
df¯
= BΥ0 (b) db
df¯
. Substitute to get
dπeq
df¯
= 2Aa
da
df¯
µ
1− b
a
Υ0 (a)
Υ0 (b)
¶
= 2Aa
da
df¯
µ
1− τ (a)τ (b)
¶
where τ (x) = Υ0 (x) /x = 1 − 1−2xx ln (1− x). The function τ (x) is strictly decreasing on (0, 1),
with τ (υ¯) = 0. From Lemma 9, there are only two cases in which da
df¯
and − db
df¯
are not both positive:
either B < A and υ¯ < b < a, or B > A and b < a < υ¯. For the first case, we have da
df¯
< 0 and
0 > τ (b) > τ (a) (and thus τ(a)τ(b) > 1), implying dπeqdf¯ > 0. For the second case, we have dadf¯ > 0 and
τ (b) > τ (a) > 0 (thus τ(a)τ(b) < 1), again implying dπ
eq
df¯
> 0.
Lemma 9 The symmetric equilibrium of the model with inelastic security costs has the following
comparative statics with respect to f¯ .
1. If B < A, then a > υ¯ and db
df¯
< 0. There is some threshold f0 such that
if f¯ < f0, then dadf¯ < 0 and b > υ¯
if f¯ > f0, then dadf¯ > 0 and b < υ¯ .
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2. If B > A, then b < υ¯ and da
df¯
> 0. There is some threshold f1 such that
if f¯ < f1, then dbdf¯ > 0 and a < υ¯
if f¯ > f1, then dbdf¯ < 0 and a > υ¯ .
Proof. Some of the analysis will be similar to the proof of equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
Equilibrium is defined by (7) and (6). As earlier, represent (6) as the condition b = γ ¡a ; f¯¢, where
γ ¡x ; f¯¢ = g−1 ¡¡1− f¯¢ g (x)¢ as before, but now we emphasize the role of f¯ by treating it as
an argument. Equivalently, we can write a = γ−1 ¡b ; f¯¢, with γ−1 ¡x ; f¯¢ = g−1 ³g(x)
1−f¯
´
. The
function Υ (x) is positive on (0, 1). It is increasing (decreasing) on the interval (0, υ¯) (on (υ¯, 1)).
Furthermore, its image satisfies Υ (0, υ¯) = Υ (υ¯, 1) = (0,Υ (υ¯)).
Part 1 B < A
If B < A, then for arbitrary b ∈ (0, 1), any a meeting (7) must satisfy Υ (a) = BAΥ (b) < Υ (b).
There are two such values of a, one to the left and one to the right of b, but only the latter is
admissible. Thus we can write this equilibrium condition as a = κ (b) where κ is a continuous
function with κ (0) = κ (1) = 1. Define μˆ ¡b ; f¯¢ = κ (b) − γ−1 ¡b ; f¯¢ and note that μˆ ¡0 ; f¯¢ > 0.
For each f¯ , by Proposition 3 there is a unique (equilibrium) b satisfying μˆ ¡b ; f¯¢ = 0. Fix f 0
and f 00, with f 0 < f 00. Let b0 and b00 be the corresponding zeros of μˆ. Consider μˆ (b0 ; f 00). The
function g−1 is increasing, so we have γ−1 (b0 ; f 00) > γ−1 (b0 ; f 0). Since μˆ (b0 ; f 0) = 0, we must
have μˆ (b0 ; f 00) < 0. Given μˆ (0, f 00) > 0, we conclude that b00 ∈ (0, b0). This suﬃces to show db
df¯
< 0.
With the fact that equilibrium b tends toward 1 as f¯ → 0 and toward 0 as f¯ → 1, this ensures that
there is some threshold f0 such that in equilibrium, b > υ¯ if f¯ < f0 and b < υ¯ if f¯ > f0.
Next, recall that (7) does not depend on f¯ . Thus, once db
df¯
is determined, da
df¯
is pinned down
by the co-movement of a and b along this curve: da
df¯
= db
df¯
da
db , where
da
db =
B
A
Υ0(b)
Υ0(a) . Suppose that
f¯ < f0. The facts that b > υ¯ and a > b imply a > υ¯. But this implies that Υ0 (b) and Υ0 (a) are
both negative, and so da
df¯
has the same sign as db
df¯
. Alternatively, suppose that f¯ > f0. Since B < A
implies Υ (a) < Υ (b) and Υ is increasing on (b, υ¯), we once again must have a > υ¯. Now we have
b < υ¯ < a, Υ0 (b) and Υ0 (a) have opposite signs, and therefore, da
df¯
and db
df¯
must have opposite signs.
Part 2 B > A
Most of the arguments from Part 1 reverse. In this case, we have Υ (b) = ABΥ (a) < Υ (a) for the
first condition. For any a ∈ (0, 1), there are two value of b that solve this equation, of which only
the one lying below a is relevant. Write this condition as b = κˆ (a) where κˆ is a continuous function
with κ (0) = 0 and κ (1) = 0. Define νˆ ¡a ; f¯¢ = κˆ (a) − γ ¡a ; f¯¢, and note that νˆ ¡1; f¯¢ = −1.
Fix f 0 < f 00 and let a0 and a00 be the corresponding zeros of νˆ. Observe that νˆ (a0, f 0) = 0 and
γ (a0, f 00) < γ (a0, f 0) imply that νˆ (a0, f 00) > 0. With νˆ ¡1; f¯¢ < 0, this implies that a00 ∈ (a0, 1).
This shows that da
df¯
> 0. The existence of f1 such that a < υ¯ for f¯ < f1 and a > υ¯ for f¯ > f1
follows as above.
Next observe that b < υ¯. If a < υ¯, this follows from b < a. If a > υ¯, this follows from
Υ (b) < Υ (a) and the fact that Υ is decreasing on (υ¯, a). As in the previous part, db
df¯
has the same
sign as da
df¯
if and only if dbda =
A
B
Υ0(a)
Υ0(b) is positive. For f¯ < f1, we have b < a < υ¯, Υ0 (a) and Υ0 (b)
have the same sign, and so db
df¯
> 0. For f¯ > f1, we have b < υ¯ < a, Υ0 (a) and Υ0 (b) have opposite
signs, and db
df¯
< 0.
Proposition 6
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Proof. An individual’s first order condition for z implies Aa2 (1− a) = Bb2 (1− b) (1− f) in
a symmetric equilibrium, just as in the previous section. Applying the aggregation relationship
1−f = ab ln(1−b)ln(1−a) , this can once again be written as AΥ (a) = BΥ (b). An individual choosing
³
z, f˜
´
when everyone else plays (z, f) has the security first order condition
Bb2ze−(1−f˜)zb − c0
³
f˜
´
= 0
so in a symmetric equilibrium we must have (using e−(1−f)zb = 1− b and zeff = (1− f) z)
Bb2 (1− b) zeff = (1− f) c0 (f)
The result follows from zeff = − ln(1−b)b .
Proposition 7
Proof. Fix (a∗, b∗) and let z∗ = − ln(1−a∗)a∗ and f∗ = 1− a∗b∗ ln(1−b
∗)
ln(1−a∗) be the candidate equilibrium
strategies. Let
³
zˆ, fˆ
´
be the individual best response to (a∗, b∗). We require conditions under which³
zˆ, fˆ
´
= (z∗, f∗). Write π (z, f ; a, b) = Aa (1− e−az) − Bb ¡1− e−b(1−f)z¢ − c (f), and formulate
an agent’s choice problem in two stages:
zˆ (f) = arg max
z∈[0,∞)π (z, f ; a
∗, b∗) (12)³
zˆ, fˆ
´
=
³
zˆ
³
fˆ
´
, fˆ
´
, where fˆ = arg max
f∈[0,1]π (zˆ (f) , f ; a
∗, b∗) (13)
First we claim that fˆ < 1. This follows because Condition C implies limf→1 c (f) =∞. The other
payoﬀ terms are bounded, so choosing f = 1 cannot be optimal. Next derive zˆ (f). The first order
condition for (12) is
∂π (z, f ; a∗, b∗)
∂z = A (a
∗)2 e−a∗z −B (b∗)2 (1− f) e−b∗(1−f)z (14)
We know that the first term decays faster than the second (because a∗ > b∗ (1− f)) and we claim
that A (a∗)2 > B (b∗)2, so ∂π(z,f ;a
∗,b∗)
∂z
¯¯¯
z=0
is strictly positive. From these points, it follows that
(for f < 1) the unique solution of ∂π(z,f ;a
∗,b∗)
∂z
¯¯¯
z=0
solves (12). Thus,
zˆ (f) =
1
a∗ − b∗ (1− f) ln
Ã
A (a∗)2
B (b∗)2 (1− f)
!
for f ∈ [0, 1)
Note that zˆ (f∗) = z∗, so if f∗ solves (13), we are done.
Turning to (13), By the envelope theorem, we have
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dπ (zˆ (f) , f ; a∗, b∗)
df
=
∂π (zˆ (f) , f ; a∗, b∗)
∂f
= B (b∗)2 zˆ (f) e−b∗(1−f)zˆ(f) − c0 (f)
If c = cm (for any m), then f∗ is a zero of this first order condition by construction. To show that
f∗ is optimal, it suﬃces to show that dπ(zˆ(f),f ;a∗,b∗)df is positive on [0, f∗) and negative on (f∗, 1).
We will choose m large enough to ensure this this is true for cm.
f ∈ [0, f∗) Define δ (f) = c01(f)
B(b∗)2zˆ(f)e−b∗(1−f)zˆ(f) and note that δ (f∗) = 1. It suﬃces to show that
we can choose ml such that rm (f) δ (f) < 1 for all m > ml and all f ∈ [0, f∗). The function
δ (f) is weakly positive and continuously diﬀerentiable on [0, 1), so let L1 = maxf∈[0,f∗]
¯¯δ0 (f)¯¯. Let
L2 = minf∈[0,f∗] c001 (f) > 0. Observe that
r1 (f) =
c01 (f)
c01 (f∗)
≤ 1− L2
c01 (f∗)
|f∗ − f | = 1− L3 |f∗ − f | ≤ 1
1 + L3 |f∗ − f |
where L3 = L2c01(f∗)
. Then we have
rm (f) ≤ 1
(1 + L3 |f∗ − f |)m ≤
1
1 +mL3 |f∗ − f |
Also note that δ (f) ≤ 1 + L1 |f∗ − f |. Combining, we have
rm (f) δ (f) ≤ 1 + L1 |f
∗ − f |
1 +mL3 |f∗ − f |
Choosing ml ≥ L1/L3 ensures that the righthand side is strictly less than one for all m > ml,
uniformly in f ∈ [0, f∗).
f ∈ (f∗, 1) First, we claim that limf→1 δ (f) =∞. To see this, use (14) to write
δ (f) = (1− f) c
0
1 (f)
A (a∗)2 zˆ (f) e−a∗zˆ(f)
As f → 1, zˆ (f) → ∞, so the denominator tends to zero while the numerator tends to infinity
by Condition C. Given this, there exists some L4 =
¯¯¯
min[f∗,1)
d ln δ(f)
df
¯¯¯
< ∞, and so we have
ln δ(f)δ(f∗) = ln δ (f) ≥ −L4 (f − f∗). Meanwhile,
r1 (f) ≥ 1 + L5 (f − f∗) where L5 = c
00
1 (f
∗)
c01 (f∗)
> 0
so ln rm (f) ≥ m ln (1 + L5 (f − f∗)). Finally, ln (rm (f) δ (f)) ≥m ln (1 + L5 (f − f∗))−L4 (f − f∗).
To guarantee rm (f) δ (f) > 1 for all f ∈ (f∗, 1), we require
m >
L4x
ln (1 + L5x)
¯¯¯¯
x=f−f∗
for all f ∈ (f∗, 1)
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The function L4xln(1+L5x) is increasing, so setmh =
L4(1−f∗)
ln(1+L5(1−f∗)) . Then, for m > mh, rm (f) δ (f) > 1
holds uniformly over f ∈ (f∗, 1).
To complete the proof, set m¯ = max (ml,mh). It only remains to prove the claim that A (a∗)2 >
B (b∗)2. From AΥ (a∗) = BΥ (b∗) it follows that A(a∗)2
B(b∗)2 =
³
− (1−b∗) ln(1−b∗)b∗
´
/
³
− (1−a∗) ln(1−a∗)a∗
´
.
The function − (1−x) ln(1−x)x is positive and decreasing on (0, 1), so the claim follows from b∗ < a∗.
Proposition 8
Proof. Because equilibria only depend on the ratio A/k, it suﬃces to fix k = 1 and show the
result for a threshold A on A. First observe that as B →∞, the condition AΥ (a) = BΥ (b) implies
that any sequence of equilibria must have b tending to zero. With this in mind, define a function
equal to the limiting value of the other equilibrium condition as b→ 0:
Q (a) = lim
b→0
µ
AΥ (a)− (1− f) c0 (f)¯¯
f=1−a
b
ln(1−b)
ln(1−a)
¶
= AΥ (a)− (1− f) c0 (f)¯¯
f=1+ a
ln(1−a)
If Q (a) = 0 has a positive solution a∗ > 0, then there is a sequence of equilibria with total
connectivity tending to a∗ as B → ∞. If furthermore individual payoﬀs are positive in this limit,
then the economy is resilient. On the other hand, if Q (a) = 0 has no solution besides a = 0, then
the economy is not resilient.
Part (i)
The function Q (a) is negative for a large enough, so to establish the existence of some aˆ > 0
with Q (aˆ) = 0, it suﬃces to show that Q (a) is strictly positive for a small. Observing that
f = 1 + aln(1−a) tends to zero with a, expand the terms of Q (a) around a = 0 and f = 0 to get:
AΥ (a) = Aa2 − 1
2
a3 + o
¡
a3
¢
(1− f) c0 (f) = (1− f)
µ
c0 (0) + fc00 (0) +
f2
2
c000 (0) +
f3
6
c(4) (0) + ...
¶
=
f3
6
c(4) (0) + o
¡
f3
¢
and
f = 1− a
a+ a
2
2 +
a3
3 + ...
=
a
2
+ o (a)
In summary, Q (a) = Aa2−¡12 + 148c(4) (0)¢ a3+o ¡a3¢. Thus, for any A > 0, we can choose a small
enough to make Q (a) strictly positive.
Next, we show that limiting payoﬀs are strictly positive. Suppose that a→ aˆ as B →∞. Write
the limiting payoﬀ as
πˆ = Aaˆ2 −dBb2 − dc (f)
where dBb2 and dc (f) are the limiting values of Bb2 and c (f) respectively. Using equilibrium condi-
tions we have
AΥ (aˆ)dBb2 = limB→∞,
b→0
BΥ (b)
Bb2
= lim
b→0
µ
−(1− b) ln (1− b)
b
¶
= 1
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so dBb2 = AΥ (aˆ). Convexity of c and c (0) = 0 gives us c (f) ≤ fc0 (f), so by the other equilibrium
condition we have c (f) ≤ f1−fAΥ (a). Thus,
dBb2 + dc (f) ≤ AΥ (aˆ)
1− fˆ ,
or using 1− fˆ = − aˆln(1−aˆ) , we arrive at
πˆ ≥ A
³
aˆ2 − (1− aˆ) ln (1− aˆ)2
´
.
The function g (x) = x2 − (1− x) ln (1− x)2 satisfies g (0) = g0 (0) = 0 and g00 (x) = −2x+ln(1−x)1−x .
Note that x+ln (1− x) is strictly negative on (0, 1), so g is strictly convex on (0, 1). This establishes
that g (x) is strictly positive on (0, 1), so the limiting payoﬀ πˆ is also strictly positive.
Part (ii)
Suppose that c0 (0) = c00 (0) and c000 (0) > 0; the other cases are simple extensions. Following
the same expansion as before, we have
(1− f) c0 (f)¯¯
f=1+ a
ln(1−a)
=
c000 (0)
8
a2 + o
¡
a2
¢
so Q (a) =
³
A− c000(0)8
´
a2 + o
¡
a2
¢
. The strategy is to show that we can pick A small enough that
Q (a) < 0 for all a > 0. Let A1 =
c000(0)
16 , so Q (a) = −A1a2 − (A1 −A) a2 + o
¡
a2
¢
. There exists a¯
small enough that Q (a) < 0 whenever A < A1 and a < a¯. Now return to the original formulation
Q (a) = AΥ (a)− (1− f) c0 (f)|f=1+ a
ln(1−a)
. Let L = (1− f) c0 (f)|f=1+ a
ln(1−a) ,a=
a¯
2
. Because Υ (a) is
bounded above, there exists A2 > 0 such that AΥ (a) < L for all A < A2 and all a ∈ (0, 1). Then,
because (1− f) c0 (f) is increasing in f , and f = 1 + aln(1−a) is increasing in a, we have Q (a) < 0
whenever A < A2 and a > a¯2 . Choose A = min (A1, A2). Then for all A < A, we have Q (a) strictly
negative on both (0, a¯) and
¡
a¯
2 , 1
¢
, so Q (a) is negative on (0, 1) as claimed.
Alternatively, if c0 (0) > 0 or c00 (0) > 0, then Q (a) has a negative term of order a0 or a1
respectively, so a fortiori the same method applies.
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